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Modeling for Risk in the Absence of Sufficient Data: A Strategy for Treaty Verification

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Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management ’96

Abstract

This paper presents a methodology for selecting facilities to be inspected combining game theory with qualitative measures of risk. The Chemical Weapons Convention is used as an illustrative example.

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References

  1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/140, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1970.

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  2. The Structure and Content of Agreements and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1971.

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  3. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, United States Arms Control And Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, October 1993.

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  4. Ibid., Articles IV, V and VI.

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  5. N. Kyriakopoulos, “A Model for Monitoring the Production and Distribution of Thiodiglycol”, in S. J. Lundin (ed), Verification of Dual-Use Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Case of Thiodiglycol, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, No. 13, Oxford University Press, 1991.

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  6. R. Avenhaus, M. Canty, Compliance Quantified: An Introduction to Verification Theory, Cambridge University Press, in print.

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  7. J. Nash, “Non-Cooperative Games”, Annals of Mathematics, 54.2, pp. 286–295, 1951.

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag London

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Kyriakopoulos, N., Avenhaus, R. (1996). Modeling for Risk in the Absence of Sufficient Data: A Strategy for Treaty Verification. In: Cacciabue, P.C., Papazoglou, I.A. (eds) Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management ’96. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3409-1_33

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3409-1_33

  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-3411-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-3409-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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