Abstract
We show how ideas and tools from the field of mechanism design in economics can be brought to bear on the problem of price-based control of dynamical systems. Specifically, we take inspiration from the Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves mechanism to design strategy-proof dynamic price-functions, which can induce subsystems to apply socially efficient control inputs even though they are self-interested and possibly strategically misreport their cost and dynamics’ models to the control designer.
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Langbort, C. (2012). A Mechanism Design Approach to Dynamic Price-Based Control of Multi-Agent Systems. In: Johansson, R., Rantzer, A. (eds) Distributed Decision Making and Control. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 417. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2265-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2265-4_5
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