Abstract
The problem of ‘logical omniscience’ continues to engage attention in AI. In this paper it is argued that the problem arises from interpreting formal properties of epistemic logics into agent performance domains, where agent cognition is taken to incorporate formula-manipulation, which then mirrors inference in the logic. The case of Reactive Systems is examined, where some such systems eschew such formula-manipulation in favour of fast-acting mechanisms. A formal account of such agents’ knowledge states can still be given, but the ‘problem’ of logical omniscience re-emerges in a new light.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Seel, N. (1991). The ‘Logical Omniscience’ of Reactive Systems. In: Steels, L., Smith, B. (eds) AISB91. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1852-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1852-7_6
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-19671-6
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