Abstract
The Socratic dialogue as a principle for knowledge formation and learning is discussed in depth. Dialogue is necessary when formal research techniques are no longer sufficient, and one needs to reflect upon what one does know and what needs to be done. This act of reflection is not just about the “production of information”. What is gained from dialogue is “subjective” not “objective” knowledge: the knowledge is tied to the participants. Describing the dialogue is to describe a conception of human reason — a conception of “autonomous persons, striving on an equal basis to get rid of prejudices and illusions”. Hence human reason is not primarily something inside people’s heads. The dialogue shows a process of knowledge formation by example, not by theory. Dialogue is the opposite to theory. The chapter closes with an analysis of the meaning of error. In computer science and statistics the concept of error is one-dimensional. It focusses on the misfit between theory, or model, and data. Errors are seen as being mainly technical. There is a lack of understanding about the concept of error in its many guises. For example, misunderstandings are important as they lead to greater understanding. Insecurity and uncertainty are “good” errors as they show that there is something to learn. There is no such thing as “pure knowledge”. There are only people arguing and investigating, and so on.
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Notes
The Advancement of Learning, Book II. Quoted from Spedding, James (ed) (1861) The philosophical works of Francis Bacon, vol.III, London, pp.403–404. This was the source of the title of the workshop (see Acknowledgement, p. 242 ).
Jürgen Mittelstrass says: “Im philosophischen Dialog stehen die Subjekte, nicht ihre Meinungen auf dem Spiel.” (“Versuch über den Sokratischen Dialog”, p.141).
It may be impossible adequately to catch something like “the inner weather picture” discussed by Maja-Lisa Perby in purely general terms. Cf. Perby (1988), Computerization and skill in local weather forecasting. In Göranzon, B. Josefson, Ingela (eds.) Knowledge, skill and artificial intelligence, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York. Nevertheless, we need general terms.
A concept which I think catches some aspects of “dialogue knowledge” is “knowledge of familiarity”, cf. the chapters by Göranzon, Josefson and Gullers, in Göranzon and Josefson (eds.), Knowledge, skill and artificial intelligence. The dialogue, however, focusses oncthe dynamic aspect of knowledge, something not necessarily part of the “familiarity”.
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Molander, B. (1990). Socratic Dialogue: On Dialogue and Discussion in the Formation of Knowledge. In: Göranzon, B., Florin, M. (eds) Artifical Intelligence, Culture and Language: On Education and Work. The Springer Series on Artificial Intelligence and Society. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1729-2_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1729-2_25
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