Abstract
International Standards for safety-critical software typically use notions of Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) which in our experience are difficult to apply and which lack credible assessment criteria. This paper proposes risk modelling as a basis for allocation of SILs to software and illustrates its use. It also proposes software-directed evaluation criteria for SILs. To assess what level of integrity is actually achieved. We contend that the approach leads to more credible results, and more cost-effective ways of delivering software safety assurance.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Lindsay, P.A., McDermid, J.A. (1997). A systematic approach to software safety integrity levels. In: Daniel, P. (eds) Safe Comp 97. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0997-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0997-6_6
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-76191-4
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