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Where thought lives: place or palace?

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Book cover Neural Nets WIRN Vietri-01

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Neural Computing ((PERSPECT.NEURAL))

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Abstract

Localistic versus distributive processing are seemingly antagonistic views of the central nervous system general function. The issue gives rise to complex philosophical debates that, stemming from the monistic-dualistic everliving debate, invocate justification from anatomical, functional and psychological observations. A brief sketch of the current debates is given.

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag London Limited

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Biella, G.E.M. (2002). Where thought lives: place or palace?. In: Tagliaferri, R., Marinaro, M. (eds) Neural Nets WIRN Vietri-01. Perspectives in Neural Computing. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0219-9_35

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0219-9_35

  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-85233-505-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-0219-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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