Abstract
Localistic versus distributive processing are seemingly antagonistic views of the central nervous system general function. The issue gives rise to complex philosophical debates that, stemming from the monistic-dualistic everliving debate, invocate justification from anatomical, functional and psychological observations. A brief sketch of the current debates is given.
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Biella, G.E.M. (2002). Where thought lives: place or palace?. In: Tagliaferri, R., Marinaro, M. (eds) Neural Nets WIRN Vietri-01. Perspectives in Neural Computing. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0219-9_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0219-9_35
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