A Dynamic Solution Concept to Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions

Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series (SOIA, volume 50)


The problem of distribution of payoffs through negotiation among the players in a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions is considered. It is argued that this distribution is influenced by satisfaction of the players in regard to better performance and success within a cooperative endeavour. As a possible alternative to static solutions where this point is ignored, a framework concerning the players’ satisfactions upon receiving an allocation of the worth is studied. A solution of the negotiation process is defined and the corresponding convergence theorem is established.


Cooperative Game Negotiation Process Coalition Formation Coalition Structure Nash Bargaining Solution 
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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsDibrugarh UniversityAssamIndia

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