A Dynamic Solution Concept to Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
The problem of distribution of payoffs through negotiation among the players in a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions is considered. It is argued that this distribution is influenced by satisfaction of the players in regard to better performance and success within a cooperative endeavour. As a possible alternative to static solutions where this point is ignored, a framework concerning the players’ satisfactions upon receiving an allocation of the worth is studied. A solution of the negotiation process is defined and the corresponding convergence theorem is established.
KeywordsCooperative Game Negotiation Process Coalition Formation Coalition Structure Nash Bargaining Solution
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Aubin, J.P.: MathematicalMethods of Game and Economic Theory (rev. ed.)., North-Holland, Amsterdam (1982).Google Scholar
- 4.Branzei, R., Dimitrov, D., Tijs, S.: Models in Cooperative Game Theory: Crisp, Fuzzy and Multichoice Games, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, 556, Berlin (2004)Google Scholar
- 6.Carmichael, F.: A Guide to Game Theory, Pearson Education Limited, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River (2005)Google Scholar
- 8.Friedman, J.W.: Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, New York (1986)Google Scholar
- 11.Lehrer, E.: Allocation processes in cooperative games, Int. J. Game Theory, 31, 651–654 (2002)Google Scholar
- 16.Mich, L., Fedrizzi, M., Garigliano, R.: Negotiation and Conflict Resolution in Production Engineering Through Source Control, Fuzzy Logic and Soft Computing (Ed.), Advances in Fuzzy Systems-Applications and Theory 4, World Scientific, Singapore, 181–188 (1995)Google Scholar
- 21.Tohme, F., Sandholm, T.: Coalition formation process with belief revision among bounded self interested agents, (Source: Internet, Open access article).Google Scholar