A Dynamic Solution Concept to Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
The problem of distribution of payoffs through negotiation among the players in a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions is considered. It is argued that this distribution is influenced by satisfaction of the players in regard to better performance and success within a cooperative endeavour. As a possible alternative to static solutions where this point is ignored, a framework concerning the players’ satisfactions upon receiving an allocation of the worth is studied. A solution of the negotiation process is defined and the corresponding convergence theorem is established.
KeywordsAssure Expense Nash Alloca
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