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Some Traditional Methods to Approach the Problem of Multiple Objectives

  • Willem K. Brauers
Part of the Nonconvex Optimization and Its Applications book series (NOIA, volume 73)

Abstract

Some traditional methods were thought to hold solutions for the multi-objective problem. Cost-Benefit e.g., uses one single unit, namely money. In that way, it represents an extremely materialistic approach. The person who is eager to work will be very unhappy with a purely monetary compensation. A child who lost his parents in a car accident is not compensated for his grief with a monetary payment. Security on the roads is not a purely monetary problem, but also a problem of education and trairiing, of soberness and road and weather conditions.

Keywords

Fractional Programming Plurality Rule Decision Tree Analysis Materialistic Approach Soccer Team 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes Part 3 Chapter 2

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Willem K. Brauers
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Applied Economics and Institute for Development Policy and ManagementUniversity of AntwerpBelgium

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