We studied Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong in the last three chapters. The principal purpose was to compare their record, seeking common themes, and looking for such differences among them that illuminate the catching up process. For example, Taiwan has achieved a growth record comparable to Korea in pace but more stable in profile, with no foreign debt but vibrant SMEs. Hong Kong industrialized under laissez faire, without starting with an import-substituting regime as Korea and Taiwan did. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have indigenous SMEs free to operate with any domestic or foreign firms, while the basic premise of the Korean development strategy is that the State must nurture giant business groups to compete in the world market. We now study Singapore in the same spirit.


Foreign Investor Deadweight Loss Foreign Labor Central Providence Fund Forced Saving 
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  1. 1.
    An interested reader may consult Andaya and Andaya (1982).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    For a somewhat different description of such events, see Mahathir (1970).Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    See, for example, Lee (1998: 618). In 1965 he listed from census the population mix of Malaysia and Singapore as: Malays 39%; Chinese 42%; Indians/Pakistanis 10%; North Borneo people 7%; others 2%. At most, the 46% Bumiputras was a plurality, but no majority.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    See Lee (2000: 69).Google Scholar
  5. 7.
    See Lim, Pang and Findlay (1993: 102).Google Scholar
  6. 8.
    From Chia (1986: 102)Google Scholar
  7. 11.
    For example, according to Perry, Kong and Yeoh (1997: 175), offshore mooring in Singapore can service tankers above 300,000 tons, but Port Klang and Pasir Gudang in Malaysia cannot handle tankers of more than 80,000 tons.Google Scholar
  8. 12.
    See Tonzon (2002). Here TEU stands for ‘twenty foot equivalent unit’, a standard measurement used for container capacities in terms of containers of such length.Google Scholar
  9. 13.
    See Hobday (1995).Google Scholar
  10. 14.
    See Huff (1994).Google Scholar
  11. 15.
    See Lee and Low (1990).Google Scholar
  12. 16.
    For overseas Chinese, see Wang (2000).Google Scholar
  13. 18.
    According to Bauer (1996), the government was concerned that foreign labor may have socio-political costs. For example, for unskilled foreign labor, regulations include the immediate sending back of those who failed the ‘non-pregnancy’ clause in the recruitment contract and the regular stipulated pregnancy test. The same rules in Taiwan, were recently challenged because of the Gender Equality Law (Taipei Times, Mach 31 2002).Google Scholar
  14. 21.
    According to Dr. Soon Tech-Wong, just between 1980 and 1992, net fixed asset per worker increased ten-fold.Google Scholar
  15. 22.
    Interested readers may also read Soon and Stoever (1996) for a perceptive and independent commentary on Singaporean development policy over time.Google Scholar
  16. 23.
    Hobday (1995: 144).Google Scholar
  17. 24.
    From the technical point of view, foreign investors have no reason to transfer their ‘core technology’ but the possession of ‘core technology’ is the basis of flexibility in the face of market change. (Deyo, et al., 2001).Google Scholar
  18. 25.
    See ‘The passing of Ta-yu Wu, the physics master of a generation’, p.77, Overseas Scholar, (Chinese) March 31, 2000, Taipei.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Henry Y. WanJr.

There are no affiliations available

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