Abstract
With the growth of the personal computers and the internet, computers are now integrated into our lives. With all the conveniences this phenomena also creates more vulnerabilities. An intruder who is physically located on the other side of the earth may gain access to our most secret information by breaking through our firewall and gaining access to the internals of our computing system. Compromised computers may leak our most private information: personal documents, pictures and movies, browsing history, chat history, bank account passwords, etc.
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Hu, Y., Sunar, B. (2012). Memory Integrity Protection. In: Tehranipoor, M., Wang, C. (eds) Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9_13
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