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Information Systems Development pp 333–343Cite as

CRank: A Credit Assessment Model in C2C e-Commerce

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Abstract

An increasing number of consumers not only purchase but also resell merchandise through C2C web sites. One of the greatest concerns for the netizens is the lacking of a fair credit assessment system. Trust and trustworthiness are crucial to the survival of online markets. Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders help to sustain the trust. And reputation systems provide one of the ways of building trusts online. In this chapter, we investigate a credit assessment model, CRank, for the members in the context of e-market systems, such as Alibaba, eBay, to solve such problem as how to choose a credible business partner when the customer wants to purchase some products from the Internet. CRank makes use of feedback profile made up of ranks from other users as well as an overall feedback rating for the user based on the idea of PageRank. This model can be used to build a trustable relation network among business participants.

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Acknowledgment

This paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 60803037 and 60803036), and supported by the National High-tech R&D Program of China under Grant No. 2009AA01Z143, and supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities No. HEUCFZ1010 and No. HEUCF100602.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Computer Science & Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, China

    Zhiqiang Zhang, Xiaoqin Xie, Haiwei Pan & Qilong Han

Authors
  1. Zhiqiang Zhang
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  2. Xiaoqin Xie
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  3. Haiwei Pan
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  4. Qilong Han
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Zhiqiang Zhang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Durham University, Durham, DH1 3LE, United Kingdom

    William Wei Song

  2. , School of Information Technology, Jiangxi University of Finance and Econom, Nanchang, 330013, Jiangxi, China, People's Republic

    Shenghua Xu

  3. Finance & Economics, School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of, Fenglin Rd., Nanchang, 330013, Jiangxi, China, People's Republic

    Changxuan Wan

  4. UFIDA Software Technology College, Jiangxi University of Finance & Economic, Fenglin Rd., Nanchang, 330013, Jiangxi, China, People's Republic

    Yuansheng Zhong

  5. College of Business & Economics, Dept. Information Technology &, Boise State University, Univesity Dr. 1910, Boise, 83725-1615, Idaho, USA

    Wita Wojtkowski

  6. College of Business & Economics, Dept. Information Technology &, Boise State University, Univesity Dr. 1910, Boise, 83725-1615, Idaho, USA

    Gregory Wojtkowski

  7. Fac. Information Technology, Monash University, Clayton, 3800, Victoria, Australia

    Henry Linger

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© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

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Zhang, Z., Xie, X., Pan, H., Han, Q. (2011). CRank: A Credit Assessment Model in C2C e-Commerce. In: Song, W., et al. Information Systems Development. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7355-9_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7355-9_28

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-7205-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-7355-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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