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Parallelisms and Paralogisms in the European Court of Justice

  • Giuseppe EusepiEmail author
  • Alessandra Cepparulo
  • Maurizio Intartaglia
Chapter
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Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 23)

Abstract

Of all ideas that scholars of institutional matters cherish most, none has spawned more interest than judges’ impartiality. The demonstration that the judges’ behavior cannot be fully insulated from political influence is a household item for several books and articles. Yet, conventional analysis gives almost exclusive attention to custodianship per se. Also, one of us has already provided theoretical analyses on the guardian’s guardian problem (Eusepi 2006). However, works on how a guardian behaves in a supranational setting without a Constitution are rather scant. In the enlarged EU, ­sorting out the link between the member states’ courts and the European Court of Justice (henceforth ECJ) is becoming challenging. A study of the judges’ behavior in that sorting is critical for understanding what is unfolding within the EU legal system.

Keywords

Member State Trade Mark Parallel Import Constitutional Court Constitutional Treaty 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Giuseppe Eusepi
    • 1
    Email author
  • Alessandra Cepparulo
    • 2
  • Maurizio Intartaglia
    • 3
  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsSapienza University of RomeRomeItaly
  2. 2.Business SchoolUniversity of ExeterExeterUK
  3. 3.University of SheffieldSheffieldUK

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