Abstract
When a body of myths is meant to govern the material and even sometimes the spiritual dimensions of our lives, we are entitled to give a sharp look at what is at stake. This is precisely what this book is about: mythology and the founding myths are like legends, but the rites associated with this higher norm are concrete, actual procedures reflected in lower norms, customs, and institutions (Lévi-Strauss 1958). Admittedly, since Plato, written law is conceived as a necessary means of legitimacy for the sovereign. However, written law cannot by itself ensure moral or social standards of conduct and belief (begging the question of how to define such standards).
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Josselin, JM. (2011). Making and Implementing the Rules of the Game: The Political Economy of Constitutional Myths and Rites. In: Marciano, A. (eds) Constitutional Mythologies. Studies in Public Choice, vol 23. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6784-8_12
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