Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence

  • George TridimasEmail author
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 23)


Doubts about the ability of elected representatives to resolve public policy issues and disillusion with their record have often led Constitutional framers to delegate decision making authority to independent bodies like central banks and judiciaries. Indeed, the development of the legal and the monetary system are closely interconnected: The successful operation of markets is founded on the rule of law and monetary stability. Both, however, are threatened by opportunistic governments which may violate the rights of citizens and generate inflation to pursue their own objectives. Application of the law and monetary stability require that credible constraints are imposed on the discretionary powers of the government.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsUniversity of UlsterNewtownabbeyUK

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