Abstract
Government officials everywhere acknowledge a responsibility for overseeing systemic risk. But before one can begin to control a target variable (even something as straightforward as the temperature of a room), one must define the variable comprehensively and fashion from this definition one or more verifiable metrics for monitoring the target. Official definitions of systemic risk fail both of these tests.
Official definitions focus on a perceived potential for substantial spillovers of institutional defaults across important firms in the financial sector and from this sector to the real economy. These definitions are not comprehensive because they exclude a systemic phenomenon; this is that substantial spillovers of actual defaults have remained largely and predictably hypothetical.
This chapter was published in the Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 38, September 2010, and is being reprinted with permission. It builds upon and extends the ethical arguments presented in the previous chapter and reproduces and condenses some key passages from that essay.
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Notes
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I have in mind the push to adopt Basel II in the face of defects such as those uncovered by Kupiec (2009).
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Kane, E.J. (2011). Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk. In: Tatom, J. (eds) Financial Market Regulation. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6637-7_8
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