Skip to main content

How to Avoid the Next Taxpayer Bailout of the Financial System: The Narrow Banking Proposal

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Book cover Financial Market Regulation

Abstract

As recovery from the present economic crisis begins, policymakers must address what reforms will be made in the financial system in order to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar crisis in the future. In formulating these reforms, policymakers will also have to address the heightened moral hazard and broadened too big to fail doctrine associated with the bailouts of financial firms. These policies to deal with the impact of the crisis have resulted in large federal government deficits, a monetary base expansion with the potential for future inflation, and the depletion of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). What will Congress do in response? In terms of long-term financial reform, what is to be expected from Congress is passage of legislation that increases oversight and regulation by the federal financial regulatory agencies. Will the Federal Reserve System (Fed), or some other new or existing federal agency, be given additional regulatory and supervisory power to manage system risk? Will these reforms invite regulatory avoidance behavior by financial institutions or will financial innovation be stifled? These are the important questions that must be answered by any proposal to reform our financial system.

This chapter also appeared as Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief 2009-PB-05.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Bossone B (2001) Should banks be narrowed? IMF Working Paper 01/159. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01159.pdf

  • Bryan L (1991) Core banking. McKinsey Q 1:61–74

    Google Scholar 

  • Buiter W (2007) Would narrow banking prevent another Northern Rock? FT.com 22 Sept

    Google Scholar 

  • Burnham JB (1991) Deposit insurance: the case for the narrow bank, in regulation. Cato Rev Bus Gov 14(2):Spring

    Google Scholar 

  • Cao J, Illing G (April 2009) Endogenous systemic liquidity risk. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2627. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393186

  • Economist Staff (2008) Confessions of a risk manager. The Economist, 7 Aug

    Google Scholar 

  • Ely B (1991) The narrow bank: a flawed response to the failings of the federal deposit insurance, regulation. Cato Rev Bus Gov 14(2):Spring

    Google Scholar 

  • Fisher I (1935) 100% money. Adelphi Company, New York, NY

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedland J (1994) The law and structure of the international financial system: regulation in the United States, EEC, and Japan. Quorum Books, Westport, CT

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman M (1965) A program for monetary stability. In: Kendall LT, Ketchum MD (eds) Readings in financial institutions. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, pp 189–209

    Google Scholar 

  • Gola C, Roselli A (2009) The UK banking system and its regulatory and supervisory framework. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill, UK

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrod RF (1969) Money. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Herring RJ, Litan RE (1995) Financial regulation in the global economy. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Hetzel RL (1985) The rules versus discretion debate over monetary policy in the 1920s. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Econ Rev 71(Nov/Dec):5–9

    Google Scholar 

  • House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008) The run on the rock. Fifth Report of Session 2007–2008. I(Jan):13–14

    Google Scholar 

  • James KR (2007) The case for narrow banking. Central Bank of Brazil, 2nd Annual Seminar on Banking, Financial Stability and Risk, Sao Paulo, 7 May. http://www.bcb.gov.br/Pec/seminarios/SemMetInf2007/Port/KevinJames.pdf

  • Jessup P, Bochnak M (1992) A case for a U.S. postal savings system. Challenge 25(Nov/Dec): 5–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Kobayakawa S, Nakamura H (2000) A theoretical analysis of narrow banking proposals. Monet Econ Stud 18(1):May. http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/publication/mes/fmes00.html

  • Lawson N (2009) Capitalism needs a revived Glass-Steagall. Financial Times, March 16

    Google Scholar 

  • Litan RE (1987) What should banks do? The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Miles W (2001) Can narrow banking provide a substitute for depository intermediaries? Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, First Annual Missouri Economics Conference, 4–5 May. http://research.stlouisfed.org/conferences/moconf/papers/miles.pdf

  • Mishkin F (1999) Financial consolidation: dangers and opportunities. J Bank Finance 23(2–4): 675–691, Feb

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Padoa-Schioppa T (2004) Regulating finance: balancing freedom and risk. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK

    Google Scholar 

  • Phillips RJ (1995a) The Chicago plan & new deal banking reform. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY

    Google Scholar 

  • Phillips RJ (1995b) Narrow banking reconsidered: the functional approach to financial reform. Levy Institute Public Policy Brief, no. 18/1995. http://www.levy.org/pubs/ppb17.pdf

  • Pierce JL, Leone RC (1993) The future of banking. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock AJ (1992) Collateralized money: an idea whose time has come again. Challenge 35(Sept/Oct):62–64

    Google Scholar 

  • Shy O, Stenbacka RA (June 2000) Bundling argument for narrow banking. http://ozshy.50webs.com/narrow26.pdf

  • Simons HC (1948) Economic policy for a free society. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL

    Google Scholar 

  • Spong K (1996) Narrow banks: an alternative approach to banking reform. In: Papadimtriou DB (ed) Stability in the financial system. St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY, pp 360–384

    Google Scholar 

  • Tobin J (1987) The case for preserving regulatory distinctions. In: Restructuring the financial system: a symposium sponsored by the federal reserve bank of Kansas City, 20–22 August:167–183. https://http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/1987/S87TOBIN.PDF

  • Wallace N (1996) Narrow banking meets the diamond-Dybvig model. Federal Reserve Bank Minneapolis Q Rev (Winter) 20(1):3–13. http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR2011.pdf

  • Wilmoth AE (2002) Restructuring the American safety net after Gram-Leach-Bliley. In: Gup BE (ed) The future of banking. Quorum Books, Westport, CT, pp 101–130

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ronnie J. Phillips .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Networks Financial Institute

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Phillips, R.J., Roselli, A. (2011). How to Avoid the Next Taxpayer Bailout of the Financial System: The Narrow Banking Proposal. In: Tatom, J. (eds) Financial Market Regulation. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6637-7_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6637-7_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-6636-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-6637-7

  • eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics