Abstract
The establishment of the International Criminal Court and its recent efforts to address war crimes in ongoing conflicts present a case for discontinuing the practice of constituting ad hoc war crimes tribunals in countries that are recovering from civil conflict. This chapter argues that seating international criminal tribunals in the location of atrocities is capable of generating positive externalities that aid in overall post-conflict development. Using data from the Special Court for Sierra Leone, we estimate the marginal benefits of seating the hybrid court in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and report on the positive externalities that were generated for the country.
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Notes
- 1.
“Universal” to the extent that countries are signatories of the treaty-based Rome Statute. As of July 2008, 108 countries had become States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The jurisdiction of the ICC is based on “complementarity”, which allows national courts the first opportunity to investigate or prosecute.
- 2.
The SPSC experience in East Timor has not been very successful, due in part to difficulties in securing extradition agreements with Indonesia, where many of the indictees fled, and to continuing security threats to the stability of the East Timor government.
- 3.
Notwithstanding efforts to control the myriad costs of housing a court in another country, the ICTY and the ICTR proved very expensive to operate – in 2000, the cost of operating the courts constituted a full 10% of the United Nations budget (Dougherty 2004).
- 4.
Kposowa (2006) makes the case that the underlying foundations of the Sierra Leone conflict were laid through general erosion in respect for the rule of law and a gradual breakdown in law and order for two decades before the conflict began in 1991.
- 5.
The “after November 1996” limitation was due to amnesty provisions of the Abidjan Peace Agreement of November 30, 1996.
- 6.
See World Development Indicator by the World Bank (2007).
- 7.
Transparency International (TI) is a global civil society organization which fights against corruption by bringing people together in a worldwide coalition to raise awareness of corruption and end the impact of corruption on humans around the world. The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was first released in 1995 and it has gained extensive attention in business, political, and intellectual circles. The CPI ranks 180 countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. On a scale of 1–10, 1 is exceedingly corrupt, and 10 is superlatively clean (a rare and exceptional situation).
- 8.
For extended discussion of the problems, accomplishments, and challenges of the Court, see Human Rights Watch, Bringing Justice: the Special Court for Sierra Leone, September 7, 2004. Downloaded September 2008 from http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/09/07/bringing-justice-special-court-sierra-leone-0: 1–55.
- 9.
The donor amounts are a part of the UN’s consolidated appeal process and do not necessarily account for projects earmarked by donors for special projects delivered by NGOs. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, financial contributions to the Special Court for Sierra Leone were voluntary and not assessed. The Secretary General suggested that contributions be assessed on members, but the Security Council opted for voluntary contributions. The viability of the Court at the inceptive stage of operation became severely threatened because of inadequate financial support.
- 10.
Among all Registry areas in the annual budget, the “security” function has the single largest allocation of personnel assigned to it – 68 staff.
- 11.
The World Bank classifies poverty into two categories: (1) extreme poverty (living on a dollar or less a day); and (2) severe poverty (living on two dollars a day). In 2001 and 2002, Sierra Leone Police officers were paid Le 42,000 approximately $21 a month. Inadequate income has been inextricably linked with corruption. Full time security officers of the Special Court for Sierra Leone were paid $200 a month, a very significant increase in income.
- 12.
Article 16 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone gives the Registrar the overall responsibility for the administration and servicing of the Special Court. The other vital components of the Court include judges, chambers, office of the prosecutor, and the office of defense.
- 13.
For further discussion and detailed analysis of cost-benefit analysis see Brent’s Applied Cost-Benefit Analysis.
- 14.
This amount is also indicative of benefits that could have been achieved as a result of an aggressive pursuit of funds by the Management Committee, rather than the pursuit of severe cuts.
- 15.
See the Sixth Annual Report of the President for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, obtainable from www.sc-sl.org.
- 16.
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established in 2007 with a mandate to prosecute persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. Fifty-one percent of the costs of the Special Tribunal are borne by voluntary contributions from supporting states, while the Government of the Lebanese Republic finances 49% of the costs.
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Warburton, C.E.S., Culp, R.F. (2011). Can Domestically Seated War Crimes Tribunals Generate Positive Externalities? A Case Study of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In: Andreopoulos, G., Barberet, R., Levine, J. (eds) International Criminal Justice. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1102-5_8
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