Skip to main content

Introduction: The Problem of Selves and Persons in Psychology

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency

Abstract

Most of us have a somewhat inconsistent attitude toward our being selves and persons. On the one hand, we frequently act as if there is nothing that is more real or true about our lives than the seemingly obvious fact that we exist as thinking, feeling individuals. Indeed, so powerful does this idea seem that René Descartes (1960) established an entire philosophical tradition based on it. On the other hand, most of us experience at least occasional difficulties in determining exactly who we are, what we want, and what makes for a meaningful life, and not infrequently describe such difficulties as stemming from problems of knowing our true selves or the kind of person we really are. To complicate matters, what we mean by “self” or “person” is not at all straightforward, and most of us would experience considerable difficulty in giving a clear and consistent definition of these terms. Nonetheless, we mostly believe that it is important to understand and feel good about who and what we are as selves and persons as a prerequisite to doing and living well. And, despite difficulties of definition and accessibility to what we might regard as our true selves or the kind of person we are, the possibility that we might not have selves at all or exist as persons would seem more than passing strange to most of us.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, Peter Strawson (1959) has argued that reactive attitudes, such as gratitude, that assume the possibility of morally praiseworthy freedom of action are so deeply embedded in our form of life that it would be impossible for us to abandon them even if determinism were true. Such dissolutionist stratagems certainly qualify as compatibilist (in opposition to the incompatibilist positions of libertarianism and hard determinism). However, some more contemporary compatibilists (e.g., the philosopher, Frankfurt, 1971, and the psychologist, Rychlak, 1988) have not so much treated incompatibilism as a pseudo-problem that should be dissolved, but have attempted to provide alternative conceptions of freedom that do not deny, although they do “soften,” determinism. Thus, Frankfurt talks about the uniquely human capacity to form “higher-order desires,” and Rychlak speaks about a kind of “transpredication” rooted in the use of language that allows humans to respond antithetically to their determination.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jack Martin .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2010 Springer-Verlag New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Martin, J., Sugarman, J.H., Hickinbottom, S. (2010). Introduction: The Problem of Selves and Persons in Psychology. In: Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics