Abstract
Many criminologists have followed Gottfredson and Hirschi’s verdict on the uselessness of conscience as an explanatory concept within criminological theory. The present chapter challenges this assessment and explores the analytical potential of “conscience” not only for the explanation of (violent) crime but also for shedding light on other aspects of social practice and exchange. It proposes the expansion of self-control into a multi-dimensional concept that comprises different functions of human agency related to the requirement of (a) expressing personal identity, (b) securing long-range personal interests, and (c) maintaining cooperative relationships with others (solidarities). The chapter also examines facets and forms of positive and negative self-appraisal, in particular shame and guilt, and considers the protective or aggravating impact they may have on aggressive or violent conduct. Some additional—and occasionally ambiguous—features of both the conceptual meaning and the social praxis of “conscience” are also discussed, taking the cognitive–developmental approach to the analysis of moral conscience as a major point of reference.
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Notes
- 1.
There are some notable exceptions to this (e.g. Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Trasler 1993; Piquero and Tibbetts 1996), but even in these cases the notion of “morality” (moral beliefs, commitments, feelings) has not been elaborated to any great extent. In more recent years, some renowned criminologists like Schoepfer and Piquero (2006), Antonaccio and Tittle (2008), and Wikström and Treiber (2007) have re-emphasized the importance of morality to our understanding of crime but, still, little progress has been made to relate these concepts (e.g., those of shame and guilt) and corresponding measurement operations to pertinent psychological research and broader theories of moral development. (I will address Wikström’s ideas more specifically in another paper under preparation).
- 2.
In this context an observation reported by Messner and Rosenfeld might be of interest: “(C)onsiderable evidence indicates that so-called ‘nonviolent’ white-collar criminals kill and maim more people each year in the United States than do violent street criminals” (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997, 29). So, for example, unsafe or defective merchandise is reported to have caused some 30,000 deaths in a single year.
- 3.
Since delinquent behavior is typically measured as a count variable which often takes the value of 0, ordinary least squares methods may not be appropriate. Bornewasser et al. therefore use logistic regression and Poisson models in their analyses (2007). They assume that much of the previous research in this field may have produced artifactual results stemming from inappropriate statistical methods used in analyzing the data.
- 4.
Wikström goes so far as to conceive of crime as “acts of moral rule breakings defined in law” (Wikström and Treiber 2007, 241)—which I think is a somewhat problematic mingling of analytical concepts that should be kept distinct.
- 5.
One may also reconsider Turner’s assumptions about “real-self” constructions shifting from their anchorage in institutions to a new anchorage in impulse (1976).
- 6.
The German subtitle of Barry Sanders’ A is for Ox (1995) is “Die Pistole ist das Schreibwerkzeug des Analphabeten” or “the gun is the pen of the illiterate.” Luhmann observes that violence is a first-rate communicative act, exactly because it raises fear (1998, 797).
- 7.
In the psychological literature on shame and guilt it is often unclear whether a statement saying that “shame” focuses on the self while “guilt” focuses on the transgressive act is meant to give a definition or, rather, meant to offer an empirical proposition claiming, e.g., that the negative evaluation of the entire self is a likely consequence of the experience of “shame”—a term whose semantic meaning would then need to be explicated without making use of the distinction between behavior versus self as the focus of negative evaluations. See, for example, the following statement by Tangney et al.: “Shame is a painful, ugly feeling that involves a global negative evaluation of the entire self. When people feel shame, they feel devalued as a person” (1996, 806). Saying that shame and guilt might become fused occasionally (as cited above) makes little sense if shame and guilt have previously been defined in terms of an opposition (self-focused versus behavior-focused).
- 8.
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office (JCSO), Columbine Documents, p. 26,012. Cited from Peter Langman, “Eric Harris: The Search for Justification.” http://www.schoolshooters.info/eric-harris-search-for-justification.pdf.
- 9.
The sociologist Thomas Scheff even claims that all social interaction is pervaded by either actual shame or embarrassment signals or, much more frequently, by the anticipation of such signals (1995, 1056).
- 10.
Though Luhmann’s “Selbst-Normierung” is reminiscent of a notion proposed by Kohlberg (and others) of voluntary or volitional self-commitment (“Selbstbindung” in German), he (1) does not consider previous stages in the development of moral consciousness which the individual has to pass through in order to reach this higher level of self-commitment, and (2) he disregards the idea that self-commitment is still experienced as an obligation (to adhere to universalistic moral principles) implying “oughtness.”
- 11.
In this section I heavily draw upon several papers by Gertrud Nunner-Winkler, in particular “Sociohistoric changes in the structure of moral motivation” (2004).
- 12.
A. Gibbard (1992, 296) expressly notes that he does not distinguish guilt and remorse (1992, 296). He refers, however, to another author (Gabrielle Taylor) who “insists there is a crucial difference: that guilt is an emotion of self-assessment, whereas remorse is not. Guilt concentrates on oneself, and involves feeling disfigured by a transgression. In remorse, the thought concentrates on the deed, seen as one’s own action.” It is noteworthy in this context that Tangney often rephrases “guilt as a sense of remorse or regret” (e.g., in Tangney et al. 1995, 349).
- 13.
On the basis of empirical research, Nunner-Winkler reports that children gain moral insight before they experience feelings of shame or guilt (1999). She interprets this result as supporting the assertion that moral feelings are not constitutive to morality. A lively discussion on these matters among more than two dozen philosophers, social scientists, theologians, and psychologists is to be found in the journal Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik 14, no. 4 (2003). Psychoanalytical literature reports feelings of shame and guilt appearing as early as age two years (see the review article by Hauser (2007)).
- 14.
Anton Leist even maintains that self-autonomy and universality are incongruously related to each other and that without bringing in non-individual elements self-commitment alone cannot assure compliance with moral norms (2003).
- 15.
At this point, one might consider Max Weber’s notion of different spheres of values outside morality: “die Ethik (ist) nicht das Einzige, was auf der Welt ,gilt‘, … neben ihr (bestehen) andere Wertsphären, deren Werte unter Umständen nur der realisieren kann, welcher ethische ‘Schuld‘ auf sich nimmt” (1973, 504). This translates as: “Ethics is not the only thing that counts in this world … alongside it there are other spheres, whose values can sometimes only be realized by those who are prepared to burden themselves with ethical ‘guilt.’”
- 16.
This might be interpreted within the scheme of cognitive dissonance theory.
- 17.
Again, we have to keep in mind that experiences of self-transcendence do not always pave the way toward love and peace. Bandura et al. even observe: “The massive threats to human welfare stem mainly from deliberate acts of principle rather than from unrestrained acts of impulse” (1996, 372).
- 18.
Our translation. Original: “daß mit einer zunehmend ich-näheren Verfügbarkeit der moralischen Konformitätsbereitschaft auch ehedem zuverlässige Barrieren gegen die Amoral geschleift werden. Schließlich ist oft nur ein schmaler Grat zwischen situativ angemessener Flexibilität und schierem Opportunismus, denn—wie Luhmann anmerkt—‘gute Gründe gibt es viele’.”
- 19.
On the relationship between rhythm and violence, see the fascinating paper by Paul Richards (2008).
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Thome, H. (2011). Self-Control, Conscience, and Criminal Violence: Some Preliminary Considerations. In: Heitmeyer, W., Haupt, HG., Malthaner, S., Kirschner, A. (eds) Control of Violence. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0383-9_5
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