Abstract
Anti-Jewish riots in Europe of the last 200 years show specific clusters in terms of the phases and regions, in which there were specific causes for the outbreaks of collective violence. In an historical analysis five phases are chosen as exemplary for escalations of the level of destruction: the phase from 1819 to 1880; the two Russian pogrom waves of 1881–1883 and 1903–1906; the pogrom wave that took place in the context of the founding of the Polish nation-state; and finally, the pogroms accompanying the beginning of the German military campaign against the Soviet Union in 1941. It can be shown that in crisis situations like revolutions, war, and regime change, which are characterized by how the status of groups change or threaten to change rapidly, violence is deployed as a means for reversing social status and affirming the dominant status of the majority group. In these situations, state control is either absent or weak, which opens up opportunities to act; in addition, the control authorities of the state itself may become actors in the violent actions. Thus forms a favorable opportunity structure for pogroms that also demonstrate a high level of violence.
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Notes
- 1.
For example in France during the periods of revolution and during the Dreyfus Affair, see Gerson (2006) and Wilson (1973); during the 1848 revolution in Europe, see Foa (1913) and Gailus (2002); during the civil war after the Russian Revolution, see Abramson (1999); during the Polish border wars, see Prusin (2005).
- 2.
Senechal de la Roche differentiates with a four-part model made up of the dimensions of individual/collective liability and higher/lower degrees of organization with four forms of collective control violence: lynching, rioting, vigilantism, and terrorism.
- 3.
The typical forms of violence displayed in pogroms, which, in modern society, are considered crimes, are described by Black as forms of conflict management, social control, and even as law in traditional societies: murder, mutilation, beating, confiscation or destruction of property, and forms of deprivation and degradation.
- 4.
The lynching murders in the American South of blacks accused of assaulting whites, for example, were seldom prosecuted, although the perpetrators were known and could easily have been arrested. This is also true generally for the prosecution of pogrom participants. They were usually tried, but received for the most part light sentences.
- 5.
Goldberg traced the 1945 pogrom in Tripoli, Libya, back to a situation of political anomie: With the Italians in retreat and the British invading, Libya in 1945 faced an uncertain political future and was in an “in-between period,” which Muslims used to restore the dominance over Jews that they had lost under Italian rule.
- 6.
Neil J. Smelser (1963) identifies the operation of social control as one of the six determinants of collective behavior, and he underscores the importance of employing state sanctions against rioters in a “quick and decisive” manner. According to Bert Useem (1997, 357) “a public safe agency has to solve three problems related to capacity: strategy (force versus diplomacy), command (level, location, and unity), and preparation.”
- 7.
According to Nipperdey (1983, 366), the French July Revolution of 1830 had “exemplary character and pan-European resonance,” since it was an expression of a general crisis of restorative order that could not easily be maintained.
- 8.
Whether or not the authorities intervened or remained passive could have an effect on the degree of violence regardless of the protocols of riots. This was demonstrated by the so-called Heidelberger Judensturm when rumors spread throughout Heidelberg on August 25, 1819, that a “Jew riot” was being planned for that night. Indeed, “bands of Hep men,” mostly journeymen and guttersnipes, gathered in the evening and ran through the Jewish quarter armed with axes and crowbars. Joined by a large crowd, they broke into the houses of prosperous Jews, plundering and destroying the household contents and causing considerable property damage. The Neue Speyerer Zeitung placed particular emphasis on the fact that the looters were able to continue undisturbed for 3 h with neither the police nor the armed citizens’ guard that had paraded through the streets that very day intervening. Help came from 200 Heidelberg students who were able to prevent further mistreatment to the Jews and the plundering of their property. The students returned the following evenings with a (few) other citizens to patrol the area and restore order to the city (Wirtz 1981, 62).
- 9.
- 10.
Gailus (1994, 164–165) identified 200 of these types of riots for Germany.
- 11.
“Their sense of right was offended, the rioters also expressed outrage against the state, which had forsaken them and their communities” (Smith 2008, 138). Fliers also show the moment of status revision: “Bittschrift der Christensklaven an die Herren-Juden um Christen Emanzipation” (Erb and Bergmann 1989, 258).
- 12.
If fatalities or injuries occurred, it was usually among the rioters, e.g., in 1889, when the military fired into the crowd in Holleschau (Hološov), Moravia, killing 5 rioters and injuring at least another 20 (Smith 2008, 148).
- 13.
Klier (1989) also stresses that the East European Jews had developed a distinct ethnoreligious culture and that they remained ethnic strangers to their neighbors. Because they remained outside the local community they were excluded from the circle of obligation. This distance and bipolarity found clear expression in the cry, “The Jews are beating our people,” that was often heard when a tavern brawl caused the outbreak of a pogrom. For a theoretical analysis of the significance of functional and social distance between groups for the exertion of violence as a means of social control, see Senechal de la Roche (1996).
- 14.
In Russia the outsider status of Jews found expression in the special legal category of “inorodtsky” or “aliens” which in the eyes of the peasants placed them outside the legal realm of protection. The Russian policies (the so-called May Laws from 1882) in reaction to the pogroms, which were regarded as understandable outbursts of popular wrath against the Jews, further reinforced this division. “Instead of ‘merging’ the Jews with the wider Christian community, the state must endeavor to protect the Gentiles from the myriad forms of Jewish exploitation. Such a goal was best secured by isolating and restricting the Jews…” (Klier 1989, 137). This set the basis for new collective violence which then appeared in the pogroms of 1903–1906.
In many cases the pogromists cited the permission granted by the political leader, be it the tsar, Bismarck, or the military leadership. Klier (2002, 166) stresses the important role of rumors, which led the tsar to demand that his subjects “put the Jews in their place.”
- 15.
“There was…a tradition in government circles of anti-Jewish sentiment, with its concomitant charge of ‘exploitation.’ Beyond this, however, a number of high-ranking personalities played an important role in the government’s change of view” (Berk 1985, 57).
- 16.
This was seen in Russia, for example, where anti-Semitic agitation in newspapers was not prevented despite the common practice of censure. Lambroza attributes an important role to the state’s lack of control over the press. “The central government should have curtailed publication of inflammatory articles in the press. The government’s refusal to muzzle or censor these periodicals becomes a contributing factor in future pogroms” (Lambroza 1992, 211).
- 17.
The unstable political situation after the tsar was assassinated made violence against outsiders, regardless of whether they were religiously or socially defined as such, relatively likely. For example on the same day that the first pogrom in Elisavetgrad broke out, a pogrom against Muslims in Baku also occurred. There were also rumors that there would be riots against the landed gentry (Klier 2002, 161).
- 18.
On the divergent development of the emancipation process in tsarist Russia, where Jewish reforms and counterreforms were frequently interchanged, see Klier (1989, 144), who comes to the negative conclusion: “The legal treatment of Russian Jewry under the tsar was a consistent failure, with serious implications for the fate of a multinational, multiethnic state.”
- 19.
Minister of Interior Ignatyev informed Alexander III that “that the rioters were protesting against the policy of the last twenty years in which the expansion of Jewish rights … was particularly damaging to the poorest classes of the population” (Rogger 1975, 18).
- 20.
Darius Staliūnas (2004) holds two factors responsible for the fact that hardly any classical pogroms occurred in the northwest provinces: the decisive action taken by the local authorities; and the economic backwardness of this region. After pogroms occurred in the southwest provinces, the government in St. Petersburg responded with orders which the governor of the northwest provinces implemented by strengthening the local police and placing the military on standby during threatening conflicts.
- 21.
“Among the changes taking place in Russia during the late imperial period, the unprecedented growth of the cities and towns may well have had a far-reaching impact. The growth of industry and commerce and the influx of tens of thousands of impoverished peasants helped to create conditions of social dislocation, economic oppression, and civil strife. … This set the stage for the anti-Jewish pogroms of the late imperial period” (Judge 1992b, 43).
- 22.
The Russian government, educated public, and clergy perceived a growing social and moral crisis of the rural population, especially widespread drunkenness and depravity as well as violent behavior. “They claimed that villagers took on ‘the likeness of beasts’ in their drunken revelries, and pointed out with great concern … to violence spreading throughout the countryside” (Frank 1996, 82).
- 23.
Just having entered office, Minister of Interior Ignatyev published a circular to all governors on May 5 demanding that they do everything in their power to prevent or stop violence against Jews because “rioters taking the law in their own hands were merely carrying out the schemes of the revolutionaries.” On May 23, 1881, similar instructions were sent out (Rogger 1975, 18). See also Governor-General Totleben’s successful prevention in the northwest provinces (Staliūnas 2004, 127 ff.).
- 24.
Despite the 51 fatalities—an unusually high number for that time—and the many hundreds injured, the Kishinev Pogrom, which Smith (2008) identifies as a turning point, followed the older pattern. In this case the escalation was due to the intense propaganda of the newspaper Bessarabets and in part to the incompetence of the local and regional authorities, in particular the passivity of the police, which did not take any preventative measures although pogrom rumors had been spreading and the Jewish communities had requested protection (Judge 1992a). The actual turning point is marked by the pogroms which occurred after the October Manifesto of 1905.
- 25.
This departure from the “normal” type of pogrom had already been acknowledged by contemporary Jews: One Jewish correspondent wrote in October 1905. “Let them plunder. We’re used to that. But why do they shoot, why do they blow us apart?” (Hamm 1993, 205).
- 26.
“The patriotic element in the 1898 riots is unmistakable.” There were demonstrations in favor of the army and against Emile Zola, whose publication “J’accuse” was seen as an attack on the French army. In some cities “members of the armed forces themselves instigated anti-Semitic demonstrations” or behaved “sympathetically toward the demonstrators.” Nevertheless the local and national authorities were alarmed and riots were in most cases put down quickly (Wilson 1973, 791–792, 802).
- 27.
The civil war-like circumstances are believed to have caused approximately 9,000 fatalities and injuries in 1905–1907 (Geifman 1993, 21, 264).
- 28.
The total number of pogroms is approximately 758; a publication of that period lists 284 locations where pogroms occurred along with the number of dead and injured Jews and material damage for each incident (Szold 1906, 34–69).
- 29.
The governor of the Mogilev province noted a general aggressive manner among Jews in comparison to the 1880s: “‘I’ve known this province for twenty-five years.’ In the 1880s there had been ‘Jewish oppression.’ Now ‘the Bund and the Social Democrats are all Jews. There are others, but the instigators are all Jews.’ Jews ‘are no longer submissive, no longer respect authority, no longer even acknowledge the police’” (Hamm 1993, 206). In the “Report of the Duma Commission on the Białystok Massacre,” the government was charged with the following: “The word ‘Jew’ and the word ‘conspirator’ were synonyms to the police and they used the word ‘revolutionary’ to designate a Jew or a conspirator” (Szold 1906, 71).
- 30.
Die Pahlen-Kommission (1883–1888) “conceded that there was substance to a new kind of charge leveled against the Jews: their prominence in the camp of anarchism and revolution. This had given rise to the belief that Judaism was a natural breeding ground of subversion.” The Russian Minister of Interior Pleve announced in 1903 that he “considered the Jews, because of their characteristics and political activities, to be a danger to state and nation” (Rogger 1975, 24, 41).
- 31.
In 1906 the Duma discussed the pogroms and the government’s involvement in them. See for this discussion and a respective resolution of the Duma Szold (1906, 85–89).
- 32.
In Kiev, for example, representatives of the city council appealed to Minister of Interior Witte on October 18, the day the pogrom broke out, and he ordered by telegraph on October 19 for the pogrom to be stopped immediately. Local authorities did not call for it to stop until October 20 (Hamm 1993, 190).
- 33.
In the 1881–1883 wave of pogroms “almost all fatalities occurred when Jews used, or were accused of using, firearms to defend themselves in the course of a pogrom, usually by firing wildly into a mob” (Klier 2002, 166).
- 34.
In Kishinev rumors about Jewish resistance increased the anger and fear of the enraged population. There were more victims and greater destruction in the areas where the Jews—still unorganized—attempted to defend themselves (Judge 1992a, 56–57).
- 35.
- 36.
This is how Penkower (2004, 201) summarized the pattern of a pogrom wave: “Again and again, Jews fell prey to effective anti-Semitic press agitation, local official encouragement, police support, limited action taken against the pogromshiki, and a central government taking the role of the bystander, all the while accusing the Jews of being responsible.”
- 37.
Compare the expulsions and deportations of Jews and Germans from the front zone who in 1914 and April–October 1915 were regarded as possible collaborators. In the Jewish settlements this often degenerated into pogrom-like violence, with murder, looting, and rape, whereas the actions taken against Poles, Ukrainians, and Germans were not characterized by these atrocities (Prusin 2005, 55). “The treatment of Jews in the front zone reflected the ebb and flow of Russia’s fortunes in the war” (Prusin 2005, 59–60). Lohr (2003, 145 ff.; see also 2000) stresses that these pogroms were different from the Russian prewar pogroms due to the participation of the army, in particular of the Cossacks. The main theme was taking possession of Jewish property. The same pattern of plunder, rape, and murder is found in pogroms engaged in by Cossacks and Bulgarians during the Russian invasion of Bulgaria in 1876–1878, where Jews were officially declared a hostile element supporting the Turks (Shaw 1991, 192).
- 38.
In all, 688 places were affected; more precise information is available for 531 locations. For more on these statistics, see Gergel (1951, 240). According to Gergel, 40% of the pogroms (493) were carried out by General Petlura and his generals, another 307 by insurgents and marauding gangs, and 213 by Denikin’s White army. The Red Army was responsible for 106 pogroms; however, some of them were carried out by troops that had switched to the Soviet side. The Polish army was responsible for 32 pogroms (Gergel 1951, 244).
- 39.
According to Gergel’s statistics there were 34,719 fatalities at 531 locations, for which more precise information is available. If we add the number of dead at the other 164 locations and the injured who later died from their wounds, then his conservative estimate for the number of deaths lies between 50,000 and 60,000 (Gergel 1951, 246, 249).
- 40.
In Hungary during the counterrevolution against the pro-Bolshevist Soviet government there was also an “extraordinary rise in mob and paramilitary violence” against the former functionaries of the Communist regime, progressive intellectuals, Jews, union leaders, workers, and poor peasants. Half of the ca. 5,000–6,000 dead were Jewish (Bodo 2006). In Czechoslovakia, on December 1–2, 1918, anti-German riots in Prague reverted into anti-Jewish riots. In Holešov on December 3–4 riots occurred during which Jews were killed and the Jewish quarter was plundered (Polonsky and Riff 1981, 88).
- 41.
These attacks were carried out by soldiers and peasants (Prusin 2005, 72); the worst riots in Kolbuszowa, Rzeszów district, cost eight people their lives and left hundreds injured. The unusually high number of deaths and injuries for this kind of riot can be explained by the participation of soldiers in a social revolt (Michlic 2006, 111).
- 42.
Pogroms in Płock, Białystok, and Kielce were carried out by Polish soldiers from August to October 1920; then pogroms at more than 16 locations in the districts of Stanisławów and Zołkiew were carried out by the Ukrainian army and the Cossacks.
- 43.
Michlic (2006, 109) sees in this ethnonationalism one of “the main factors behind various anti-Jewish hostilities that occur in interwar Poland. There were also other factors behind hostilities, including economic greed and a desire to plunder and cause physical and moral injuries. … The myth of the Jew as a national threat constituted a premise for the legitimization of anti-Jewish violence as a national self-defense”; for more on violence as national self-defense and the complementary concept of Jewish provocation, see Michlic (2006, 117 ff., 125 ff.).
- 44.
On the controversial figures, see Prusin (2005, 85); there were another 37 riots in West Galicia in November, likewise in East Galicia.
- 45.
“At the time of the victorious celebration, a mob of civilians and solders rushed into the Jewish quarters, smashing windows, breaking into houses, and murdering people regardless of age or sex…. The assailants’ mood was fortified by the rumors that the attack was a ‘punitive’ expedition and that the Polish command had ‘granted’ the defenders of Lwow a free hand in Jewish quarters” (Prusin 2005, 81–82). Of the 2,815 registered attacks, 1,916 cases involved common Polish soldiers; 494, officer patrols; and 391 cases of soldiers and civilians acting together (Mick 2000, 142). The role of the military is even clearer in the example of Pińsk, which had for a long time been labeled a pogrom in historical literature although it was an execution of 35 Jews including women and children by a military unit (Tomaszewski 1986).
- 46.
That the military leadership in Lemberg (Lviv) was responsible for not stopping the pogrom is illustrated by the example of Przymysl (Prusin 2005, 85), where, on November 11, the same basic constellation existed: a pogrom began but was prevented by the intervention of the Polish commander. Prusin (2005, 91) summarizes: “It stands to reason … that the conduct of the Polish command was the main factor behind the violence. Common soldiers were convinced that they had the permission to loot the Jewish quarters, and some Polish commanders believed that Jews were to be punished for their treachery.” In its unpublished report, the commission sent by the Polish Foreign Office expressed strong criticism of the Polish military leaders for not having carried out their duty (Mick 2000, 142).
- 47.
For example, there were riots during the retreat in Minsk-Mazowiecki, Siedlce, Luków, Białystok, etc., with many fatalities.
- 48.
Michlic (2006, 109–110) identifies four levels of justification offered by Poles: “first, mandating and justifying anti-Jewish violence; second, paying tribute to the perpetrators of such violence as national heroes; third, shifting responsibility for such violence onto the victims; and finally, minimizing the unethical and criminal nature of such violence.”
- 49.
Thirty-one pogroms with their fatalities are listed in Zbikowski (1993).
- 50.
Stang (1999, 75) also comments that there were “numerous days in Kaunas in which a power vacuum existed that the nationalistic circles sought to fill,” since by June 24 German rule had not yet reached all areas. For Sara Shner-Neshamit (1997), Lithuanian “partisans” had already appeared on the streets during the retreat of the Soviet troops. In her opinion, Lithuania was “in the first days of the occupation, before the German Wehrmacht completed its takeover of Lithuania, … in the hands of ‘The Activists’ Front of Lithuania and its murderous gangs. Jewish lives and property were at their mercy.”
- 51.
“Although the vast majority of the Jewish population would suffer along with Lithuanians, the visibility of Jews in the Soviet governmental apparatus worked to totally change perceptions of the ethnic hierarchy” (Petersen 2002, 106).
- 52.
A Jewish witness vividly describes this: “Every Jew held his head high. If he met a Lithuanian on the sidewalk, the Lithuanian would step off the curb to let him by. Before the Russians came, it had been just the reverse” (Petersen 2002, 105).
- 53.
See a similar example in the pogrom of Tripoli, Libya, in 1945 (Goldberg 1990).
- 54.
See also Zbikowski (1993, 175), who writes of the need “to take revenge” and “to pay the Jews back.” A Lithuanian witness vividly describes this sudden status reversal. The fact that Jews were now serving in political functions and getting involved in the affairs of the population meant that Lithuanians “who lived peacefully for centuries together with the Jews, in the course of a single year literally came to hate them” (Zuvinats 1989, cited in Petersen 2002, 109). Zbikowski (1993, 174) sees the pogroms as a consequence of two processes: in the virulent anti-Semitism of the interwar period in the affected areas and in the “fresh” memory of the pro-Soviet attitude of Jews during the country’s occupation. Sandkühler (1996, 113) quotes a Lemberger flier in which the Jews are threatened with revenge: “You welcomed Stalin with flowers, we will greet Hitler by placing your heads at his feet.”
- 55.
In contrast to Gross, Rossino (2003, 432) claims on the basis of German sources that “the outbreak of ‘popular’ violence against Jews was directly related to policies that the SS implemented during the brief ‘transitional phase.’” In contrast to Petersen, McQueen (1997) presents a different picture. Dieckmann (1998, 304) also refers to the “systematic character” of the pogroms. In his view the pogrom in Kaunas, in which the entire Jewish quarter was attacked and 3,800 Jews murdered in five nights, was instigated by the head of the Einsatzgruppe A, Walter Stahlecker.
- 56.
See on this the first Einsatzbefehl (Deployment Order) from Reinhard Heydrich from June 29, 1941, in which the concealed support for self-cleansing efforts of anti-Communist or anti-Jewish circles was given. But the pogrom in Kaunas had begun on June 23, before this deployment order had been dispatched (McQueen 1997, 95).
- 57.
Although Germans were somewhat involved in Lemberg, according to Sandkühler, the Einsatzgruppe C praised the Ukrainians for their “welcomed activities” before their arrival. The fact that the populations in different territories conducted themselves very differently (for example, in Kaunas and Vilnius) is for Petersen an indication that during pogroms the motivation of the people or the local political groups and the external influence of the Germans had to have worked together.
- 58.
In radio broadcasts to Lithuania from Germany on the eve of the German invasion LAF propagandists explicitly urged the population to take harsh measures against the Jews (McQueen 1997, 97): “The hour to finally settle the score with the Jews has arrived. Lithuania has not only to liberate itself from the Asian Bolshevists, but also from the many years under the Jewish yoke.” (Matthäus 2003, 81). McQueen (1999, 24 ff.) speaks of how in Lithuania an “entire myth of Jewish guilt” developed so that the pogroms became a kind of “self-purification” crusade in which the guilt of collaboration with the enemy was to be atoned for. Many non-Jewish Lithuanians also fell victim to this violence. See also the OUN’s propagandistic preparation of the Lemberg pogrom (Sandkühler 1996, 116).
- 59.
Apparently, the Einsatzgruppe C and the Army High Command 17 had agreed not to interfere with the local population’s “blood court” against the Jews (Sandkühler 1996, 114).
- 60.
Confirmed by Prusin (2005, 116): “In this context, the role of control agencies in East Galicia was paramount …official anti-Jewish policies and the frequent inactivity of local officials facilitated the popular conviction that attacks were approved or encouraged by higher authorities.”
- 61.
Prusin (2005, 114–115) also stresses the escalating effect of war: “Only in the conducive atmosphere of wartime, however, did centuries-long animosities explode into large-scale violence. War reinforced the popular beliefs in the secretive and destructive nature of Jewish communities and created a highly charged atmosphere of anxiety and fear, whereby Jews were blamed for political and economic subversion.”
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Bergmann, W. (2011). Ethnic Riots in Situations of Loss of Control: Revolution, Civil War, and Regime Change as Opportunity Structures for Anti-Jewish Violence in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe. In: Heitmeyer, W., Haupt, HG., Malthaner, S., Kirschner, A. (eds) Control of Violence. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0383-9_21
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