Abstract
According to conventional counterterrorism approaches, terrorist groups should be disintegrated and isolated. The corresponding strategy is to make terrorist groups and their ideologies unattractive and prevent them from building a base. Yet weakening terrorists’ support can have an ambivalent effect and does not necessarily guarantee a reduction in violence. Such is the case illustrated by the inner-Islamic debate. After al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya’s ideological revisions, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (al-Jihad) soon came to emulate al-Jamaa’s change of mind while al-Qaida ignored the calls to cease violence and instead labeled al-Jamaa members traitors and government agents. Why, the question arises, did one group come to choose moderation while the other did not? The findings of this study are counterintuitive yet conclusive. A closer look at both groups quickly reveals that the Egyptian Islamic Jihad has a group of followers while there was and still is no consistent support base standing behind al-Zawahiri, second in command of al-Qaida. But whereas some authors describe the group as the leaderless jihad, this chapter looks at the implications of a baseless jihad and argues that it is precisely the lack of a defined support base which helps to explain how al-Qaida’s “leaders” resist a ceasefire.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Together with the British-based Airey Neave Trust.
- 2.
USIP Special Report: How Terrorism Ends, May 1999.
- 3.
Hadith are narrations of the sayings and acts of the prophet Mohamed.
- 4.
The peace declaration and texts outlining these revisions were first published in the Egyptian daily newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm in summer 2007. Although the Egyptian Islamic Jihad has not resorted to violence in Egypt since 1995, its spiritual leader felt compelled to declare a formal peace agreement through revisions. Sheikh Sayyid Imam in his interview claims that those revisions are not intended for al-Jihad members only, but should be used as a guide for all fundamentalists in the world to renounce violence.
- 5.
Sayyid Imam, known as Dr. Fadl and Abdel Qader bin Abdel Aziz, was al-Jihad’s leader between 1984 and 1993, while Ayman al-Zawahiri was the second in command. Sayyid Imam himself wrote his book Master of Preparation: Jihad for the Sake of Allah in the late 1980s while he was in Afghanistan. A few years later he published Compendium of Holy Knowledge in 2000 pages, where he presented his vision of violence, calling for disobeying the state and justifying terrorist operations targeted at foreigners and Egyptians alike.
- 6.
Al-Zayyat talks about change of strategy from near to far enemy. In the early stages of fighting, the focus was on the near enemy, the Egyptian regime. Afterward, the strategy shifted to target those who supported Arab regimes. The conclusion was that local governments cannot survive without military and financial assistance from the United States and Europe, thus making them legitimate targets in an attempt to indirectly affect the near enemy.
- 7.
Ayman al-Zawahiri was originally one of the founding members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and in 1998 together with those loyal to him, joined forces with Osama bin Laden to form the International Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders, later to become al-Qaida. Initially, he disagreed with the idea of striking against the far enemy, and showed no interest in shifting strategy to attack Americans. However, once in Afghanistan, he changed his opinion and became a strong supporter of the idea that both near and far enemies should be attacked simultaneously. In his book Knights under the Prophet’s Banner he states: “to reemphasize what we have already explained, we reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage.” Furthermore, he credits Sayyid Qutb for helping him shape al-Qaida’s doctrine. Qutb’s ideas helped them “realize that the internal enemy was no less dangerous than the external enemy and that the internal enemy was a tool used by the external enemy and a screen behind which it hid to launch its war on Islam.” The book was smuggled out of Afghanistan’s Kandahar region to the border city of Peshawar and then to London. It was later published in London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat.
- 8.
Sheikh Sayyid’s revisions cover a range of issues and topics. Apart from jihad, the revisions also recall recent history and shed some light on unknown events that had taken place.
- 9.
Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya members that we spoke to have openly admitted that tragic mistakes were made in the course of their violent campaign against the government.
- 10.
Interviews with Montasser al-Zayyat and senior members of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya were conducted in Cairo throughout the summer of 2006.
- 11.
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and Egypt.
- 12.
Islamists do not recognize secular or nationally organized states. Therefore, if Muslims are to be free of poverty and humiliation, they must aim for the establishment of an all-encompassing Islamic state ruled on sharia principles. For more on the difference between an Islamic state and a nationally organized state within the Islamic context see Bargouti (2008).
- 13.
For more on the difference, origins, and implications of the far and near enemy strategies see Gerges (2005).
- 14.
Ayman al-Zawahiri is al-Qaida’s second in command after Osama bin Laden.
- 15.
Within an Islamic context, fatwa in itself is not a law, but serves more as a judgment or nonbinding advice by an experienced Islamic scholar or religious figure. Just as one imam can issue a fatwa against violence, another one is capable of issuing a fatwa supporting violence. In 1998 Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on all Americans, Jews, and corrupt Muslim leaders. Although he was not taken too seriously, several indiscriminate terrorist attacks against civilian targets worldwide showed that such a fatwa should not be ignored. Many al-Qaida sympathizers associated themselves with Osama bin Laden, turning his fatwa into an ideology to fight all enemies of Islam with theological reasoning. For more details and the transcript of bin Laden’s fatwa, see Gunaratna (2002).
- 16.
Al-Qaida translates as “the base.”
- 17.
Interview with Montasser al-Zayyat, Cairo, summer 2006.
- 18.
Interview with Prof. Emad Shahin, Cairo, summer 2006.
- 19.
Interview with Montasser al-Zayyat.
- 20.
The Middle East Media Research Institute, 25.01.2008, “Sayyid Imam vs. al-Qaida.”
- 21.
Thereby also implying that repression can backfire, since it hinders such communication by forcing the leadership into isolation.
- 22.
The London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat published excerpts from the book in December 2001/January 2002. Apart from Arabic text, certain parts were also translated into English.
- 23.
Al-Zayyat (2002). In his book Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, al-Zawahiri confesses of hardships endured in prisons: “…the toughest thing about captivity is forcing the ‘mujahid,’ under the force of torture, to confess about his colleagues, destroy his movement with his own hands, and offer his and his colleagues’ secrets to his enemies.” See Al-Zawahiri (2001).
- 24.
Al-Zawahiri (2001).
- 25.
Author interview with Diaa Rashwan.
- 26.
Makram Mohammed Ahmed interview with al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya leadership, Cairo, 2004.
- 27.
Interview in Cairo, summer 2006.
- 28.
Author interview with senior Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya member, Cairo, summer 2006.
- 29.
National Intelligence Council Report on Global Trends.
- 30.
See Rapoport (2003).
References
Abdellah, N. I. et al. (2002). Harma Al Ghouloun Fi Al Din Wua Takfir Al Muslimin. Cairo: Islamic Turath Book Shop.
Al-Sharif, A. M. et al. (2002). Tasslit al-Addwaa ala ma Waqaa fi al-Jihad min al-Akhtaa. Cairo: Islamic Turath Book Shop.
Al-Zawahiri, A. (2001). Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. London: Alsharq Al-Awsat.
Al-Zayyat, M. (2004). The Road to Al-Qaida. London: Pluto.
Ashour, O. (2007). Lions tamed? An inquiry into the causes of de-radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic group. Middle East Journal, 61(4), 596–625.
Bargouti, T. (2008). The Umma and the Dawla—the Nation State and the Arabic Middle East. London: Pluto.
Gerges, F. A. (2005). The Far Enemy. Why Jihad Went Global. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gunaratna, R. (2002). Inside Al-Qaida—Global Network of Terror. London: C. Hurst.
Hafez, M. (2003). Why Muslims Rebel. London: Lynne Rienner.
Hafez, O. I. et al. (2002). Mubadara Waq’f Al Anf - Ru’uia Waquiiya wa Nazra Shariia. Cairo: Islamic Turath Book Shop.
Halawi, J. (2007a). Jihad reconsidered. Al-Ahram Weekly, 874.
Halawi, J. (2007b). Bidding violence farewell. Al-Ahram Weekly, 872.
Khatib, A. (2007). Al Jihad’s revisions scare Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri. Al-Masry Al-Youm, Cairo. November 11, 2007.
Rapoport, D. (2003). The four waves of rebel terror and September 11. In C. W. Kegley (Ed.), The New Global Terrorism (pp. 36–51). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Rashwan, D. (2009). the renunciation of violence by Egyptian jihadi organizations. In T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan (Eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind (pp. 113–132). London: Routledge.
Raswhan, D. (2007). The obstacle course of revisions: Gamaah versus jihad. Al-Ahram Commentary, 80.
Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless Jihad. Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadephia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Schafey, M. (2007). Jailed Islamists revise jihad concept. Asharq Al-Awsat, London, November 26, 2007.
Zohdi, K. et al. (2004). Istratigia wa Tafjirat Al-Qaida—al-Akhtaa wa al-Akhtar. Cairo: Islamic Turath Book Shop.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Al-Hashimi, K., Goerzig, C. (2011). Baseless Jihad. In: Heitmeyer, W., Haupt, HG., Malthaner, S., Kirschner, A. (eds) Control of Violence. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0383-9_20
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0383-9_20
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-0382-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-0383-9
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawSocial Sciences (R0)