Abstract
The behavior of militant Islamist groups with respect to dynamics of control (and loss of control) is inherently connected to their relationship with their constituencies. Control emerges as a result of orientation toward and interaction with a population valued as the militants’ reference group. By tracing relationship patterns and their development in two case studies—the Egyptian group al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya and Hizbullah in Lebanon—the analysis identifies two converse, self-reinforcing dynamics: On the one hand, a process of violent escalation leading to tensions with the local population, radicalization, estrangement, and eventually a loss of constraints on violent practices. On the other hand, a pattern of development in which support reinforces the militants’ orientation toward a community, inducing self-restraint in their violent campaign, which in turn reinforces the support relationship.
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Notes
- 1.
Interview with lawyer Abdel Halim Mamdour, Cairo, February 2005.
- 2.
Hizbullah later claimed the attack in Tyre and another one against the same target in 1983, but denied responsibility for (tactically similar) suicide bombings against the Multinational Force in Beirut.
- 3.
Statement sent to the offices of AFP, cited in The Economist, October 29, 1983.
- 4.
The term “constituency” is used here to denote the population—that is, real social groups—to whom the militants refer and with whom they actually interact, whereas “reference groups” denote an element of the subjective perspective of an actor; i.e., the actors’ way of orienting themselves toward certain groups, collectivities, or social categories (see Merton 1968).
- 5.
For example, small, isolated “cults” such as the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo; see Malthaner (2005, 118–119).
- 6.
- 7.
The realm of political and non-political currents in contemporary Islam is, of course, multifaceted and complex. The definition given here is meant to roughly circumscribe Islamism as a certain type of ideological framework and social/political movement, mainly those influenced by Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), Abu l-Ala Maududi (1903–1979), and later Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) as the most prominent voices of a trend that can be traced back to the classical Salafiyya of the late nineteenth century.
- 8.
Interview with the leader of an al-Jihad group involved in the attack, Cairo, January 2005.
- 9.
On the reference groups of terrorist and insurgent groups, see Malthaner (2005, 85–90).
- 10.
Interview with the former leader of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya for Assiut, London, July 2005.
- 11.
- 12.
Osama Hafez, al-Jamaa leader, discussing past errors and mistakes, in 2002. Speech recorded by Mukrim Mohammad Ahmad, printed in al-Mussawar, no. 4055, June 28, 2002, 8–10.
- 13.
The family of one al-Jamaa sympathizer explained: “Because of what happened, the arrests and the suffering, and they were humiliated and tortured to death—it turned into some kind of revenge between the victims’ families and their friends and the police.” The clashes in Ayn Shams, they said, “had nothing to do with any militant action against the government,” they were not terrorist acts like those in other parts of the country. Interviews with residents of Ayn Shams, Cairo, March 2005.
- 14.
Cited and described by al-Berry (2002, 43).
- 15.
See report of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, published in excerpts in al-Ahram, Jan. 22 to Feb. 2, 1994.
- 16.
On the killing of alleged collaborators, see inter alia Chris Hedges’s report on incidents in Assiut, New York Times, Feb. 11, 1994; Khaled Dawoud’s account on the situation in Mallawi, AP, Oct. 18, 1994; AFP, Sept. 14, 1995. In late 1996, a local human rights activist from Mallawi explained: “The fact that they are only targeting informers is indeed a sign of weakness,” DPA, Oct. 25, 1996.
- 17.
AFP, Dec. 8, 1994; APF, June 3, 1995; AFP, June 5, 1995.
- 18.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, extracts published in al-Sharq al-Awsat, Dec. 2, 2001.
- 19.
- 20.
While Hizbullah claimed the attacks on Israeli targets, it denied responsibility for the suicide attacks against American and French troops, and for most abductions of foreigners, with the exception of several kidnappings of alleged foreign spies.
- 21.
Interview with former UNIFIL advisor Timur Goksel, Beirut, December 2006.
- 22.
See, for example, the letter by the Lebanese envoy to the United Nations, August 24, 1984, UN Doc. S/16713, or the UNIFIL report for the period October 1984–April 1985 (UN Document S/17093), which gives a detailed description of typical procedures during the frequent search operations.
- 23.
Interview with resident of West Beirut and Hizbullah sympathizer, July 2007.
- 24.
Interview with residents of West Beirut, July 2005.
- 25.
Whether and to what degree Hizbullah used force in its efforts to introduce norms of moral conduct is debated, and Nasrallah denied that any “extremist” behavior of this kind occurred. Smit (2000, 225–226), Jaber (1997, 52–53), Rieck (1989, 591–592), and Sankari (2005, 218), among others, report incidents of this kind, similarly Rosiny (1996, 239) who rightly remarks that the perpetrators of these incidents were not always clear and many acts were probably perpetrated by Shiite groups not directly connected to Hizbullah. The fact that Sheikh Fadlallah warned on several occasions that, for example, destroying bars or clubs was “counterproductive,” however, can be regarded as an indirect confirmation that elements from within and around Hizbullah were involved (Rosiny 1996, 228, 238).
- 26.
Timur Goksel, cited in Jaber (1996, 30).
- 27.
On the discourse among Islamist clerics, particularly the role of Sheikh Hussein Fadlallah, see Kramer (1990, 141–149; 1997, 118–121).
- 28.
Author’s data, compiled on the basis of a list of martyrs (“shuhada al-muqawama al-islamiyya”) published by Hizbullah, Beirut 2006.
- 29.
- 30.
Hassan Nasrallah, interview with al-Safir, April 30, 1996, in Noe (2007, 157).
- 31.
Interview with Hassan Nasrallah in al-Khaleej, March 11, 1986, translated and published in Noe (2007, 26).
- 32.
“Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World,” February 16, 1985, translated and published in Norton (1987, 167–189).
- 33.
Statement in al-Ahd, April 10, 1987, cited by Kramer (1993, 545).
- 34.
“Open Letter,” see note 32, 175.
- 35.
In 1992, Nasrallah stated: “Regarding the project of the Islamic Republic, I can assure you that we will never propose this option per se in Lebanon, neither through statements, slogans or speeches…. We are in fact saying to the Lebanese people that if they choose an Islamic system, we would hasten to support it.” Interview with al-Nahar, Sept. 11, 1993, published in Noe (2007, 90).
- 36.
Hassan Nasrallah in an interview with Nida al-Watan, August 31, 1993, published in Noe (2007, 137).
- 37.
Author’s data, compiled on the basis of a list of martyrs (“shuhada al-muqawama al-islamiyya”) published by Hizbullah, Beirut 2006.
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Malthaner, S. (2011). Fighting for the Community of Believers: Dynamics of Control in the Relationship Between Militant Islamist Movements and their Constituencies. In: Heitmeyer, W., Haupt, HG., Malthaner, S., Kirschner, A. (eds) Control of Violence. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0383-9_19
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