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Part of the book series: The Making of the 20th Century ((MATWCE))

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Abstract

In the months prior to the conference at Stresa, Italian military planning had been wholly dominated by preparations for the Italian assault on Ethiopia the following October.1 Although Mussolini’s cautious political advances to the British government over negotiated territorial changes in East Africa had not produced fruitful results and had, if anything, simply incurred official suspicion, the Italian dictator was determined to wage a war of conquest in Africa that autumn. Accordingly, he committed very significant numbers of men and equipment to the East African theatre.

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Notes

  1. R. Mallett, ‘Fascist Foreign Policy and Official Italian Views of Anthony Eden in the 1930s’, Historical Journal, 43, 1 (2000), p. 173.

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  2. USSME, H-6, racc. 7, ‘Piano Z’, operations department, war ministry, 21/5/1935; F. Minniti, Fino alla guerra. Strategie e conflitto nella politica di potenza di Mussolini, 1923–40 (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Rome, 2000), pp. 100–1.

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  3. DDI, 8, I, 253; N. Rostow, Anglo-French Relations, 1934–36 (Macmillan, London, 1984), p. 159.

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  4. The Earl of Avon, The Avon Memoirs. Facing the Dictators (Cassell, London, 1962), pp. 237–8;

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  5. R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement. British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (Macmillan, London, 1993), p. 48.

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  6. The classic counter-positions are those of A. Marder, ‘The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935–36’, American Historical Review, 75, 5 (1969), pp. 1327–56

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  7. R. Quartararo, ‘Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean on the Eve of the Ethiopian Crisis (July–October 1935)’, Historical Journal, 20, 1 (1977), pp. 185–220.

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  8. S. Morewood, ‘The Chiefs of Staff, the “men on the spot” and the Italo-Abyssinian emergency, 1935–36’, in D. Richardson and G. Stone (eds), Decisions and Diplomacy. Essays in Twentieth Century International History (LSE, London, 1995), p. 94.

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© 2003 Robert Mallett

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Mallett, R. (2003). A New Alignment. In: Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–1940. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-3774-2_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-3774-2_3

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-74815-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4039-3774-2

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