Abstract
Since the first days of fascist rule Mussolini had repeatedly affirmed the ‘greatness and necessity of war’ and, consequently, stressed Italy’s need to conquer its place in the world.1 The fasci di combattimento, as Mussolini christened the new political movement he founded (in 1919) amid the turmoil of post-First-World-War Italy, was made up mostly of ex-combatants who disliked the new Europe of Versailles and who wanted their nation to secure great power status. First-day fascists like Emilio De Bono, Dino Grandi, Italo Balbo and indeed Mussolini himself detested the liberal and socialist society in which they found themselves, and wanted to revolutionise Italy and transform its place within the international order.2 There could be no compromise with those who opposed such a world-view, as the violence and repression that marked the fascist ventennio clearly demonstrated.
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Notes
G. Mosse, The Fascist Revolution. Toward a General Theory of Fascism (Howard Fertig, New York, 1999), p. 17.
M. Caudana, Il figlio del fabbro. Vol. I (Centro Editoriale Nazionale, Rome, 1962), pp. 155–6;
C. Segre, Italo Balbo. A Fascist Life (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1987), p. 77.
S. Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle. The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1997), pp. 162–4.
A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia. Dal fascismo a Ghedajfi (Mondadori, Milan, 1994), pp. 5–232.
Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito (Rome) (USSME), H-6, racc. 2, ‘Traccia per la compilazione delle memorie preliminari sui piani di operazione’, operations department, war ministry, 26/10/1928; L. Ceva, Le forze armate (UTET, Turin, 1981), p. 207;
R. Mallett, ‘The Italian Naval High Command and the Mediterranean Crisis, January–October 1935’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 22, 4 (1999), pp. 80–1.
L. Ceva, ‘1927. Una riunione fra Mussolini e i vertici militari’, Il Politico, 1, 2 (1985), p. 331; Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare (Rome) (USMM), Direttive generali (DG), 0–2, fascicolo I1, ‘Libro di guerra. Piano III - Ipotesi Italia contro Francia e Jugoslavia’, operations division, naval staff, 2/10/1929.
C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870–1914 (Routledge and KeganPaul, London, 1975), p. 247.
ACS, Badoglio, scattola 4, De Bono to Mussolini and Badoglio, 29/11/ 1932; E. De Bono, La conquista dell’impero. La preparazione e le prime operazioni (Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura, Rome, 1937), pp. 5–7.
L. Ceva, ‘Appunti per una storia dello Stato Maggiore generale fino alla vigilia della ‘‘non-belligeranza’’, giugno 1925-luglio 1939’, Storia Contemporanea, 10, 2 (1979), p. 228;
E. M. Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder (Macmillan, London, 1977), pp. 98–100; Mallett, ‘The Italian Naval High Command’, pp. 5–7; Mallett, Italian Navy p. 9. 6, f:5, ‘Situazione austriaca’, SIM, 5/6/1934; Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution pp. 100–1;
I. Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris (Penguin, London, 1998), pp. 522–3.
B. R. Sullivan, ‘From Little Brother to Senior Partner: Fascist Italian Perceptions of the Nazis and of Hitler’s Regime, 1930–36’, Intelligence and National Security, 13, 1 (1998), p. 101; Kershaw, Hubris pp. 523–4; ASMAE, AP: Germania, busta 22, fascicolo 4, ‘La cronaca degli avvenimenti del 30 giugno’, Pittalis to Mussolini, 17/7/1934.
R. J. Young, France and the Origins of the Second World War (Macmillan, London, 1996), pp. 22–3, 63–5.
For Grandi’s own account see D. Grandi, Il mio paese. Ricordi autobiografici, (Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985), pp. 335–43;
R. J. Young, ‘Soldiers and Diplomats: The French Embassy and Franco-Italian Relations, 1935–6’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 7, 1 (1984), pp. 75–6; I documenti diplomatici italiani (DDI), 7th series, vol. XVI, 338.
Mussolini also ordered the SIM to exchange intelligence on the Germans with the French 2e Bureau. See M. Roatta, Sciacalli addosso al SIM (Corso, Rome, 1955), p. 122.
DDI, 7, XVI, 399;Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution pp. 196–7; G. Warner, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1968), pp. 64–72.
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© 2003 Robert Mallett
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Mallett, R. (2003). A Tortuous Landscape. In: Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–1940. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-3774-2_2
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