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Part of the book series: The Making of the 20th Century ((MATWCE))

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Abstract

The year 1939 was a year of harsh realities in international politics. First, Hitler tore up the Munich settlement and, on 15 March, occupied the remainder of rump Czechoslovakia. According to Bernardo Attolico, the Führer’s decision had been made suddenly, like ‘a bolt out of the blue’, as he put it. Even Goering, part of the dictator’s inner circle had, apparently, known nothing and had left Berlin for San Remo on the 3rd, unaware that anything of the sort was planned.1 Hitler’s action came as a surprise to everyone. The British and French governments reacted with stunned embarrassment, and over the coming weeks and months came to the slow, painful conclusion that deals with Hitler were a bad idea. The dramatic events of March 1939 also impacted markedly on relations between the two arch-antagonists, Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. As Geoffrey Roberts notes, the seeds of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, concluded that August amid a shocked global reaction, are to be found in the events of that spring.2 Even as Hitler and Ribbentrop prepared the ground for the signing of the Pact of Steel with Mussolini’s Italy, tentative German attempts at a rapprochement with the Russians had already begun, arousing the profound interest of the Italian ambassador in Moscow.3

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Notes

  1. G. Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War. Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933–41 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995), p. 73.

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  2. M. Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: MD, 1967), pp. 307–402.

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  3. P. Pastorelli, ‘Il Patto d’Acciaio nelle carte dell’Archivio Segreto di Gabinetto’, in Pastorelli, Dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale (LED, Milan, 1997), p. 147.

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  4. D. C. Watt, How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–39 (Heinemann, London, 1990), pp. 271–88.

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  5. F. Guarneri, Battaglie economiche tra le due grandi guerra, vol. II (Rizzoli, Milan, 1953), p. 434;

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  6. C. Favagrossa, Perche perdemmo la guerra (Rizzoli, Milan, 1946), pp. 44–50.

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  7. USSME, H-9, racc. 3, fascicolo 5, ‘Scorte benzina’, cabinet office, war ministry to Mussolini, 31/8/1939, and ‘Scorte di materie prime’, cabinet office, war ministry to Mussolini, 31/1/1939; for more detail on military shortages as a whole see ‘Situazione delle forze armate alla data del1 novembre 1939’, in USSME, Diario Storico del Comando Supremo, vol. I, tomo II (USSME, Rome, 1986), pp. 157–9.

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  8. R. Mallett, ‘The Anglo-Italian War Trade Negotiations, Contraband Control and the Failure to Appease Mussolini, 1939–40’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 8, 1 (1997), pp. 139–51.

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  9. USMM, L’organizzazione della Marina durante il conflitto, tomo I, Efficienza all’apertura delle ostilità (USMM, Rome, 1972), appendix 6, Cavagnari to Mussolini, 14/4/1940, pp. 351–2.

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© 2003 Robert Mallett

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Mallett, R. (2003). Commitments. In: Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–1940. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-3774-2_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-3774-2_11

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-74815-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4039-3774-2

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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