Goodman’s Expression as Reference

Abstract

As he wanted to avoid in his metaphysics meaning, intensional accounts, and abstract objects, Goodman was likewise intent in his analysis of art to avoid such commitments, and hence, his view that aesthetics is referential functioning within a semantic account that posits only individuals is consistent. Thus the distinction between what the art object represents and what it expresses was not, for Goodman, a difference between the kinds of thing represented and the kinds of thing expressed. Instead, the correct approach is to analyze the different ways the different grammatical parts of the sentence, which is used to describe the picture, are said to function referentially. So whereas the picture denotes what it represents, it does not denote what it expresses i.e., the picture does not denote sadness; rather, the picture is denoted by the predicate “sad”. Clearly, the platonic associations of the notion and word “property” are ones Goodman must avoid if he is to explain expression solely in terms of extensionalist reference, which is the genus encompassing all the separate species of denotation, representation, expression, and exemplification. Representation and expression are the two different kinds of symbolization, and denotation and exemplification are the two ways the referencing is accomplished.