Normal Form Games

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 346)


Epistemic characterisation theorems uncover the epistemic assumptions that underlie game-theoretic solution concepts. Their antecedents contain statements involving players’ beliefs, preferences and rationality principles; their consequents describe actions. This, at least, is the ideal that the belief–desire outlook on human agency inspires, and this ideal is shared by most of the results from the Epistemic Programme.


Hull Nash Defend Prefix Stake 


  1. Pearce, D., ‘Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection’, Econometrica, 52 (1984), 1029–1050.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Stalnaker, R., ‘Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games’, Economics and Philosophy, 12 (1996), 133–163 (repr. with proofs in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3–38).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Stalnaker, R., ‘On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts’, Theory and Decision, 37 (1994), 49–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations