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Four Theses on Probabilities, Causes, Propensities

  • Mauricio SuárezEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 347)

Abstract

This introduction summarises the main themes of the book, and sketches a theory of the relation between propensities and probabilities that is consistent with many of the claims stated throughout the book. The theory is developed around four different theses concerning respectively: the objective nature of probability in physics, the key role played by transition probabilities in modelling statistical phenomena, the apparent redundancy of philosophical interpretations of probability, and last but not least, the ubiquity of causal concepts and presuppositions underlying probability models.

Keywords

Conditional Probability Conditional Independence Dispositional Property Outcome Space Bohmian Mechanic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Netherlands 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Logic and Philosophy of ScienceComplutense University of MadridMadridSpain

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