Skepticism is still a potential problem for my theory. Although the dissociation of justification from probability does not vitiate the justification of ordinary beliefs, perhaps skeptical implications of my transmission principles do. If I am justified in believing that I have hands, inference from this belief entitles me to believe justifiedly that I am not the victim of a skeptical scenario in which I do not have hands but merely appear to. But in denying that I am the victim of such a skeptical scenario, I commit myself to the truth of a proposition of whose falsity I could have no indication. There is some plausibility to the principle that one cannot be justified in believing a proposition whose falsity one would be unable to detect. On this principle (DP; “D” for detectable, not for detected), CJE precludes my believing justifiedly that I have hands.
KeywordsActual World Knowledge Attribution Doxastic Attitude Skeptical Argument Epistemic Property
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