Epistemic Paradox

  • Jarrett Leplin
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 112)

According to the paradox of the preface, one is justified in disbelieving the conjunction of one’s beliefs. CJC cannot allow this (supposing one believes justifiedly), but what is to prevent it? One’s own experience, like that of anyone else, cautions against confidence in one’s belief-system as a whole. It would seem to be justified, indeed compelled on pain of hubris, to expect some among one’s present beliefs to turn out false. This expectation is not localizable; it impugns no belief in particular. Hence one’s (presumed) justifications for one’s beliefs, taken individually, are unaffected by it. But the justification that CJC supplies for their conjunction is defeated.


Statistical Probability Inductive Basis Correct Probability Epistemic Property Epistemic Goal 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jarrett Leplin
    • 1
  1. 1.Chapel HillUSA

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