Interpretation, Coordination and Conformity

  • Hykel Hosni
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 15)

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this paper is to investigate a very general problem of (radical) interpretation in terms of a simple coordination game: the conformity game. We show how, within our mathematical framework, the solution concept for the conformity game does indeed provide an algorithmic procedure facilitating triangulation, in the sense of Davidson.

Keywords

Entropy Lution Dinate Nash Stim 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hykel Hosni
    • 1
  1. 1.Scuola Normale Superiore Piazza dei CavalieriPisaItaly

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