Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory

  • Chapter
French Studies In The Philosophy Of Science

Part of the book series: Boston Studies In The Philosophy Of Science ((BSPS,volume 276))

According to the philosophical position of epistemological holism, the statements of the empirical sciences do not relate to observations singly, but collectively. This is because these statements belong to logically complex theoretical structures, which are to a large extent indivisible, and also because further theoretical assumptions (an “observational theory”) underlie the observations made to check them empirically. As a consequence of this basic claim, all brands of epistemological holism include an underdetermination thesis, to the effect that the scientists’ decisions about hypotheses are underdetermined by the evidence available to them, and in particular, by the results of the tests they perform. Pragmatic reasons must eventually prevail in the choice of attributing the evidence to this or that part of the theoretical whole, and when elaborating on these reasons, philosophers of science will never offer more than partial and context-dependent guidelines.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Bibliography

  • Fondements et applications de la théorie du risque en économétrie, Paris, Centre National sde la Recherche Scientifique, 1953.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allais Maurice (1953a), “Fondements d’une théorie positive des choix comportant un risque et critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école américaine”, Appendix to Fondements, pp. 257–332. Reprint, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1955. English transl. “The Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving Risk and a Criticism of the Postulates and Axioms of the American School”, in Allais and Hagen, 1979, pp. 27–145.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allais Maurice (1953b), “Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque”, Econometrica, 21, pp. 503–546.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allais Maurice (1979), “The So-called Allais Paradox and Rational Decisions Under Uncertainty”, in Allais and Hagen, 1979, pp. 437–683.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allais Maurice (1988), “The General Theory of Random Choices in Relation to the Invariant Cardinal Utility Function and the Specific Probability Function. The (U, θ) Model: A General Overview”, in Munier, 1988, pp. 231–289.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allais Maurice and Hagen O. (1979) (eds), Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Allais Paradox, Dordrecht, D. Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ariew Roger (1974), “The Duhem Thesis”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35, pp. 313–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bouyssou Denis and Vansnick Jean-Claude (1990), “Utilité cardinale dans le certain et choix dans le risque”, Revue écononomique, 6, pp. 979–1000.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyer Alain (1994), Introduction à la lecture de Karl Popper, Paris, Presses de l’École normale supérieure.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brenner Anastasios (1990), Duhem, science, réalité et apparence, Paris, Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Camerer Colin (1992), “Recent Tests of Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory”, in Edwards, 1992, pp. 207–251.

    Google Scholar 

  • Camerer Colin (1995), “Individual Decision Making”, in J.H. Kagel and A. Roth (eds), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, Chap. 8, pp. 587–703.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chew Soo Hong, Karni Edi and Safra Zvi (1987), “Risk Aversion in the Theory of Expected Utility with Rank Dependent Probabilities”, Journal of Economic Theory, 42, pp. 370–381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen Michèle and Tallon Jean-Marc (2000), “Décision dans le risque et l’incertain: l’apport des modèles non-additifs”, Revue d’économie politique, 110, pp. 631–681.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conslik John (1989), “Three Variants on the Allais Example”, American Economic Review, 79, pp. 392–407.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cross Rod (1982), “The Duhem-Quine Thesis, Lakatos and the Appraisal of Theories in Macroeconomics”, Economic Journal, 92, pp. 320–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diecidue Enrico, Schmidt Ulrich and Wakker Peter (2004), “The Utility of Gambling Reconsidered”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 29, pp. 241–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duhem Pierre (1906), La théorie physique. Son objet, sa structure, Paris, Chevalier et Rivière (2nd ed., 1914). Reprint, Paris, Vrin, 1981, intr. P. Brouzeng. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, English transl. by P. Wiener, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duhem Pierre (1908), Sozein ta phainomena. Essai sur la notion de théorie physique de Platon à Galilée, Paris, Hermann. Reprint Paris, Vrin, 1994, intr. by P. Brouzeng. To Save the Phenomena, English transl. by E. Dolland and C. Maschler, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1969.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards Ward (eds), (1992), Utility Theories: Measurement and Applications, Dordrecht, Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellsberg Daniel (1956), “Classic and Current Notions of ‘Measurable Utility’”, Economic Journal, 64: 528–556.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellsberg Daniel (1961), “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, pp. 643–669.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn Peter C. (1970), Utility Theory for Decision Making, New York, Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn Peter C. (1982), The Foundations of Expected Utility, Dordrecht, Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn Peter C. (1988), Nonlinear Preference and Utility Theory, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn Peter C. (1989), “Retrospective on the Utility Theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 127–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn Peter C. and Wakker Peter (1995), “The Invention of the Independence Condition for Preferences”, Management Science, 41, 1130–1144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor Jerry and Lepore Ernest (1992), Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, Oxford, Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman Daniel and Sunder Shyam (1994), Experimental Methods. A Primer for Economists, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman Milton and Savage Leonard J. (1948), “The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk”, Journal of Political Economy, 56, pp. 278–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman Milton and Savage Leonard J. (1952), “The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility”, Journal of Political Economy, 60, pp. 463–474.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilboa Itzakh (1987), “Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-Additive Probabilities”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16, pp. 65–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gillies Donald (1993), Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Granger Gillies (1992), La vérification, Paris, Odile Jacob.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grünbaum A. (1960), “The Duhemian Argument”, Philosophy of Science, 27, 75–88, reprinted in Harding, 1974, pp. 116–131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guala Francesco (2000), “The Logic of Normative Falsification: Rationality and Experiments in Decision Theory”, Journal of Economic Methodology, 7, pp. 59–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guala Francesco (2005), The Methodology of Experimental Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hagen Ole (1979), “Towards a Positive Theory of Preferences under Risk”, in Allais and Hagen, 1979, pp. 271–302.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hammond Peter J. (1988), “Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility”, Theory and Decision, 25, 25–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hausman Daniel and Mongin Philippe (1998), “Economists’ Responses to Anomalies: Full-Cost Pricing versus Preference Reversals”, in J. Davis (eds), New Economics and Its History. History of Political Economy, Annual Supplement, vol. 29, pp. 255–272.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hey John D. (1991), Experiments in Economics, Oxford, Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harding Sandra G. (eds) (1976), Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, Dordrecht, Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaffray Jean-Yves (1989), “Some Experimental Findings on Decision-Making under Risk and their Implications”, European Journal of Operation Research, 38, pp. 301–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jallais Sophie and Pradier Pierre-Charles (2005), “The Allais Paradox and its Immediate Consequences for Expected Utility Theory”, in P. Fontaine and R. Leonard (eds), The ‘Experiment’ in the History of Economics, Chap. 4, London, Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman Daniel and Tversky Amos (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”, Econometrica, 47, pp. 263–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karmarkar Uday (1974), “The Effect of Probabilities on the Subjective Evaluation of Lotteries”, WP no 698-74, MIT, Sloane School of Management.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karmarkar Uday (1978), “Subjective Weighted Utility: A Descriptive Extension of the Expected Utility Model”, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21, pp. 61–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos Imre (1970), “The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–196.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan Laurens. (1965), “Grünbaum on the Duhemian Argument”, Philosophy of Science, 32, 295–301, reprinted in Harding, 1974, pp. 155–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laugier Sandra (1999), “Expérience cruciale”, in D. Lecourt (eds), Dictionnaire d’histoire et philosophie des sciences, pp. 404–406.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loomes Graham and Sugden Robert (1982), “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty”, Economic Journal, 92, pp. 805–824.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loomes Graham and Sugden Robert (1986), “Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty”, Review of Economic Studies, 53, pp. 271–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luce R. Duncan and Raiffa Howard (1957), Games and Decisions, New York, Wiley, 1957.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCord Mark and Neufville Richard de (1983), “Empirical Demonstration That Expected Utility Is Not Operational”, in Stigum and Wenstop, 1983, pp. 181–199.

    Google Scholar 

  • McClennen Edward F. (1983), “Sure-Thing Doubts”, in Stigum and Wenstop, 1983, pp. 117–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacCrimmon Kenneth R. and Larsson Stig (1979), “Utility Theory: Axioms versus ‘Paradoxes’”,in Allais and Hagen, 1979, pp. 333–409.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machina Mark J. (1982), “‘Expected Utility’ Analysis without the Independence Axiom”, Econometrica, 50, pp. 277–323.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Machina Mark J. (1983), “Generalized Expected Utility Analysis and the Nature of Observed Violations of the Independence Axiom”, in Stigum and Wenstop (1983, pp. 263–293).

    Google Scholar 

  • Machina Mark J. (1987), “Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1, pp. 121–154.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machina Mark J. (1991), “Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility”, in M. Bacharach and S. Hurley (eds), Foundations of Decision Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 39–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Markowitz Harry (1952), “The Utility of Wealth”, Journal of Political Economy, 60, pp. 151–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marshall Alfred (1890), Principles of Economics, London, MacMillan, 8th ed., 1920.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marschak Jacob (1950), Rational Behavior, “Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility”, Econometrica, 18, pp. 111–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mongin Philippe (1988), “Problèmes de Duhem en théorie de l’utilité espérée”, Fundamenta Scientiae, 9, pp. 289–317.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mongin Philippe (1997), “Expected Utility Theory”, in J. Davis, W. Hands and U. Mäki (eds), Handbook of Economic Methodology, London, Elgar, 1997, pp. 342–350.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mongin Philippe (2003), “L’axiomatisation et les théories économiques”, Revue économique, 54, pp. 99–103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mongin Philippe (2006), “A Concept of Progress for Normative Economics”, Economics and Philosophy, 22, pp. 19–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mosteller Frederick and Nogee Philip (1951), “An Experimental Measurement of Utility”, Journal of Political Economy, 59, 371–404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Munier Bertrand (1988), “A Guide to Decision-Making under Uncertainty”, in Munier, 1988, pp. 1–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • Munier Bertrand (eds), (1988), Risk, Decision, and Rationality, Dordrecht, Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper Karl (1935), Logik der Forschung, Vienna, Julius Springer. Transl. as The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, Hutchinson, 1959 (6th revised ed., 1972).

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper Karl (1963), Conjectures and Refutations, London, Routledge (4th revised ed., 1972).

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper Karl (1983), The Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery, I. Realism and the Aim of Science, London, Hutchinson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quiggin John (1982), “A Theory of Anticipated Utility”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, 3, 323–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quine Willard V.O. (1953), From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubin Herman (1949), “The Existence of Measurable Utility and Psychological Probability”, Cowles Discussion Papers, no 332.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, Paul A. (1952a), “Utility, Preference, and Probability” in J. Stiglitz (eds), The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, 1, Chap. 13, 127–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson Paul A. (1952b), “Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom”, Econometric Society, 20, 670–678.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Savage Leonard J. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics, New York, Wiley, 2nd ed., New York, Dover, 1972.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmeidler David (1986), “Integral Representation without Additivity”, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 97, 255–261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmeidler David (1989), “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity”, Econometrica, 57, 571–587.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Segal Uzi (1992), “The Independence Axiom versus the Reduction Axiom: Must We Have Both?”, in Edwards, p. 165–183.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slovic Paul and Tversky Amos (1974), “Who Accepts Savage’s Axiom?”, Behavioral Science, 19, 368–373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Starmer Chris (2000), “Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: the Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk”, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 332–382.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden Robert (1986), “New Developments in the Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty”, Bulletin of Economic Research, 38, 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stigum Bernt and Wenstop Fred (1983) (eds), Foundations of Utility and Risk theory with Applications, Dordrecht, Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian Hal R. (1978), Microeconomic Analysis, New York, Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Neumann John and Morgenstern Oskar (1944), The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton, Princeton University Press (2nd ed. 1947).

    Google Scholar 

  • Vuillemin Jules (1979), “On Duhem and Quine’s Theses”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 9, 69–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yaari Menahem (1987), “The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk”, Econometrica, 55, 95–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. GREG-HEC 1 rue de la Libération, 78350, Jouy-en-Josas, France

    Philippe Mongin

Authors
  1. Philippe Mongin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Département de philosophie, Université Paul Valéry-Montpellier III, route de Mende, 34199, Montpellier cedex 5, France

    Anastasios Brenner

  2. Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques, Université Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, 13 rue du Four, 75006, Paris, France

    Jean Gayon

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mongin, P. (2009). Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory. In: Brenner, A., Gayon, J. (eds) French Studies In The Philosophy Of Science. Boston Studies In The Philosophy Of Science, vol 276. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9368-5_13

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation