Popper's Continuing Relevance

  • Ian Jarvie
Part of the Boston Studies in The Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 272)

Popper claims that error indicates what to avoid and there is no recipe for how to proceed. Most rationalist philosophers ignore his arguments and still try to justify their views instead of trying to improve upon them by criticizing them and conjecturing alternatives. In public discourse barren forms of justification are widespread. More and better critical institutions are required, and these require political compromise on shared aims.


Open Society Objective Knowledge Direct Democracy Normal Science Conspiracy Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ian Jarvie
    • 1
  1. 1.York UniversityTorontoCanada

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