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Belief and Degrees of Belief

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Degrees of Belief

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Formal Epistemology Research Group Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany

    Franz Huber

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  1. Formal Epistemology Research Group Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box X906, 78457 Konstanz, Germany

    Franz Huber

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Leipzig, 04009 Leipzig, Germany

    Christoph Schmidt-Petri

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Huber, F. (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In: Huber, F., Schmidt-Petri, C. (eds) Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library, vol 342. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_1

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