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Shapiro, S. (2009). The Measure of Scottish Neo-Logicism. In: Lindström, S., Palmgren, E., Segerberg, K., Stoltenberg-Hansen, V. (eds) Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. Synthese Library, vol 341. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8926-8_4
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