Abstract
According to the late Richard Jeffrey’s “lite logicism”, a kind of a cross between Frege-Russell logicism and Hilbert’s formalism, mathematics is logical only in the sense in which physics is empirical: the data of mathematics are logical, as the data of physics are empirical, though in each case a theoretical structure of the science goes far beyond the data. After this view is introduced and compared and contrasted with others, the question just what form the “protocol sentences” or reports of data are to take is examined.
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© 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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Burgess, J.P. (2009). Protocol Sentences for Lite Logicism. In: Lindström, S., Palmgren, E., Segerberg, K., Stoltenberg-Hansen, V. (eds) Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. Synthese Library, vol 341. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8926-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8926-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-8925-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-8926-8
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