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Intuitionism and the Anti-Justification of Bivalence

  • Peter Pagin
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 341)

Abstract

Dag Prawitz has argued [12] that it is possible intuitionistically to prove the validity of ’ A → there is a proof of ⌌A⌍’ by induction over formula complexity, provided we observe an object language/meta-language distinction. In the present paper I mainly argue that if the object language with its axioms and rules can be represented as a formal system, then the proof fails. I also argue that if this restriction is lifted, at each level of the language hierarchy, then the proof can go through, but at the expense of virtually reducing the concept of a proof to that of truth in a non-constructive sense.

Keywords

Formal System Object Language Equivalence Principle Intuitionistic Logic Logical Constant 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Pagin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyStockheelm UniversityStockheelmSweden

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