Truth and Democracy: Pragmatism and the Deliberative Virtues

In this chapter1 I shall address the question of whether there is a defensible and non-circular justification of deliberative democratic politics and the things it takes to be valuable — freedom of association, freedom of speech, listening to the views of others, expanding public spaces in which open debate can flourish, etc. Why should we value open debate and discussion over private decision-making and then voting, over bargaining, or over elimination of those who disagree with us? What can we say to the anti-democrat in our midst?

The answers, I shall suggest, require reference to warranted and true belief. The justification of deliberative democratic politics, that is, is epistemic. In Sect. 3.2, I shall begin by clearing away some common negative reactions to the idea that truth and politics can co-exist and then I shall suggest that they must co-exist. I shall then argue, in Sect. 3.3, that the link between truth and politics is sustainable only if we adopt the conception of truth of a certain kind of pragmatist. This kind of pragma-tist sees truth as being the best that human inquirers could do. We will then be in a position to see, in Sects. 3.4 and 3.5, how a model of the democratic virtues and democratic citizenship might also be justified.