Assumptions of Normativity: Two Ancient Approaches to Agency

In the recent scholarly literature concerning the notion of self in antiquity, increasing attention has been paid to the fact that those ancient discussions that we can best conceptualise by using the notion of a person (or ‘self’) involve a strong normative dimension. Tony Long has put it vividly: the crucial ancient question related to personhood is what we are to make of ourselves.¹ In the ancient framework, if we succeed in transforming ourselves into ideal agents, we become virtuous and virtuous activities taken as a whole form a good human life.

In order for us to be able to mould ourselves in a relevant way, we need to be able to make overall decisions concerning our life. Such decisions also require freedom of choice. These capacities imply responsibility for one’s actions and the possibility of being good or bad. In other words, human beings are moral agents. In some cases the demarcation line between agents and non-agents is easy to draw. To borrow Mary Margaret McCabe’s example: we are not to blame lampposts – even though we often do, I would add – if we bump into them, but it is perfectly reasonable to ethically evaluate the conduct of (adult) human beings.2 However, there are cases like madmen, children, and animals in which the notion of agency is more problematic.