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On the Rationality and Stability of a Minimal Consensus

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Political Legitimization without Morality?

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Zintl, R. (2008). On the Rationality and Stability of a Minimal Consensus. In: Kühnelt, J. (eds) Political Legitimization without Morality?. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8576-5_7

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