Political Contractarianism and Equally Distributed Basic Rights

  • Jörg Kühnelt


Expense Defend Alan Guaran 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Baurmann, Michael (2002): The Market of Virtue – Morality and Commitment in a Liberal Society, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers (Springer).Google Scholar
  2. Buchanan, James (1999 [1975]): The Limits of Liberty – Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
  3. Dworkin, Ronald (2002): Sovereign Virtue, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Granovetter, Mark (1985): “Economic Action and Social Structure – The Problem of Embeddedness”, in: The American Journal of Sociology, 91. pp. 481–510.Google Scholar
  5. Hardin, Russell (2003): “The Freerider Problem”, in: Zalta, Edward (ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/free-rider/>.Google Scholar
  6. Hayek, Friedrich von (1967): Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  7. Heap, Shaun and Varoufakis, Yanis (2004): Game Theory – A Critical Text, London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  8. Hobbes, Thomas (1991 [1651]): Leviathan, edited by Tuck, Richard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Kliemt, Hartmut and Güth, Werner (2008): “The Rationality of Rational Fools: The Role of Commitments, Persons and Agents in Rational Choice Modelling”, in Peter, Fabienne and Schmid, Hans Bernhard (eds.): Rationality and Commitment, Oxford: Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
  10. Kühnelt, Jörg (2009): Pluralismus und Vertragstheorien, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  11. Ludwig, Bernd (1998): Die Wiederentdeckung des Epikureischen Naturrechts, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.Google Scholar
  12. Nozick, Robert (1974): Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  13. Pettit, Philip (2002 [1995]): “The Virtual Reality of Homo Oeconomicus”, in: Pettit, Philip (ed.): Rules, Reasons, and Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Rawls, John (1993): Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Ryan, Alan (1996): “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy”, in: Sorell, Tom (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Selten, Reinhard (1991): “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior”, in: Games and Economic Behavior, 3, pp. 3–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Sen, Amartya (1977): “Rational Fools – A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory”, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, pp. 317–344.Google Scholar
  18. Simon, Herbert (1997): Models of Bounded Rationality, Volume 3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reasons, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.Google Scholar
  19. Simon, Herbert and March, James (1958): Organizations, New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
  20. Sugden, Robert (1993): “The Contractarian Enterprise”, in: Gauthier, David and Sugden, Robert (eds.): Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract. Themes from Morals by agreement, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  21. Wolfstetter, Elmar and Demougin, Dominique (eds.), (1994): Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jörg Kühnelt

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations