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Law, Liberty and Reason

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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 86))

Do laws always restrict the liberty of the people who live under them? Or, if some laws are thought to be non-coercive—for example, laws that make voting possible— is this at least true of coercive laws? Does the coercion involved in threatening to impose penalties mean that the subjects of the laws thereby suffer a loss of freedom?

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Pettit, P. (2009). Law, Liberty and Reason. In: Bongiovanni, G., Sartor, G., Valentini, C. (eds) Reasonableness and Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 86. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8500-0_5

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