I shall argue for a sufficientist understanding of reasonableness in legal decision-making: cognitive or moral optimality are not required for reasonableness; what needed is just that a determination—be it epistemic or practical—is sufficiently good (acceptable, or at least not unacceptable). Correspondingly, judicial review on the ground of unreasonableness requires more than mere suboptimality: it requires failure to achieve the reasonableness threshold.
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Sartor, G. (2009). A Sufficientist Approach to Reasonableness in Legal Decision-Making and Judicial Review. In: Bongiovanni, G., Sartor, G., Valentini, C. (eds) Reasonableness and Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 86. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8500-0_2
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