Stephen Read argues correctly that Tarski's T-schema cannot underpin an adequate account of truth, because it yields neither an analysis of truth nor a solution to the Liar paradox. Read offers two schemas intended to do what the T-schema cannot. I argue first that Read's schemas share the failings of the T-schema, offering neither an explication of truth nor a solution to the Liar. I briefly compare Read's solution to the Liar with my own (previously published) solution. On both accounts, the Liar-sentence turns out to be simply false, but my account avoids the pitfalls that beset Read's.
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Mills, E. (2008). Scheming and Lying. In: Rahman, S., Tulenheimo, T., Genot, E. (eds) Unity, Truth and the Liar. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8468-3_6
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