Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Restrictionism: A Medieval Approach Revisited

  • Chapter
Unity, Truth and the Liar

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 8))

Restrictionism is the doctrine that self-reference is to be banned somehow, at least in some sort of cases. As a solution to the Liar paradox, restrictionism has been popular in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, and then rapidly lost ground to rival theories such as Bradwar-dine's. The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to explain what medieval restrictionism amounted to as a matter of historical fact and why it came to be abandoned; (2) to provide a modern reformulation of the approach that still seems promising as a solution to the Liar and related paradoxes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. [1] Alessio, F. (1971).Lamberto d'Auxerre. Logica (Summa Lamberti). Florence: La Nuova Italia

    Google Scholar 

  2. [2] Barwise, J. and J. Etchemendy (1987).The Liar. An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  3. [3] Beets, F. and M.-A. Gavray eds. (2005).Logique et ontologie. Liège: Éditions de l'Université de Liège

    Google Scholar 

  4. [4] Boehner, P., G. Gál and S. Brown (1974).Guillelmi de Ockham Summa logicae(=Opera PhilosophicaI). St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute

    Google Scholar 

  5. [5] Braakhuis, H.A.G. (1967). “The Second Tract on Insolubilia Found in Paris B. N. Lat. 16–617. An Edition of the Text with an Analysis of its Contents”.Vivarium5, 111–145

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Bradwardine, T. See [38]

    Google Scholar 

  7. [7] Burge, T. (1979). “Semantical Paradox”.Journal of Philosophy76, 169–198. Reprinted in [26], 83–117

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Buridan, J. See [19], Pironet [34]

    Google Scholar 

  9. Burley, W. See [38]

    Google Scholar 

  10. Campsall, R. See [50]

    Google Scholar 

  11. [11] Chihara, C. (1979). “The Semantic Paradoxes”.The Philosophical Review88, 590–618

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. [12] Davidson, D. and G. Harman eds. (1972).Semantics of Natural Language(2nd ed.). Dordrecht: Reidel

    Google Scholar 

  13. [13] Del Punta, F. (1979).Guillelmi de Ockham Expositio super libros Elenchorum(=Opera PhilosophicaIII). St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute

    Google Scholar 

  14. [14] De Rijk, L.M. (1966). “Some Notes on the Medieval Tract De In-solubilibus, with the Edition of a Tract Dating from the End of the Twelfth Century”.Vivarium4, 83–115

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. [15] De Rijk, L.M. (1972).Peter of Spain. Tractatus. Assen: Van Gorcum

    Google Scholar 

  16. [16] Ebbesen, S. et al. (1984).Simon of Faversham. Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

    Google Scholar 

  17. [17] Ebbesen, S. and P.V. Spade (1988). “More Liars”.Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin56, 193–227

    Google Scholar 

  18. [18] Gupta, A. (1982). “Truth and Paradox”.Journal of Philosophical Logic11, 1–60. Reprinted in [26], 175–235

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. [19] Klima, G. (2001).John Buridan. Summulae deDialectica. Engl. transl. New Haven: Yale University Press

    Google Scholar 

  20. [20] Koons, R.C. (1992).Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  21. [21] Kretzmann, N., A. Kenny and J. Pinborg eds. (1982).The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  22. [22] Kripke, S. (1975). “Outline of a Theory of Truth”.The Journal of Philosophy72, 690–716. Reprinted in [26], 53–81

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Lambert of Auxerre. See [1]

    Google Scholar 

  24. [24] Loux, M.J. (1974).Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part I of theSumma Logicae. (Engl. transl.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press

    Google Scholar 

  25. [25] Mackie, J.L. (1973).Truth, Probability and Paradox. Oxford: Clarendon

    Google Scholar 

  26. [26] Martin, R.L. ed. (1984).Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Oxford: Clarendon

    Google Scholar 

  27. [27] McGee, V. (1991).Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox. Indianapolis: Hackett

    Google Scholar 

  28. Panaccio, C. (1993). “Solving the Insolubles: Hints from Ockham and Burley”. In [36], 398–410

    Google Scholar 

  29. Panaccio, C. (2001). “Le Menteur: plaidoyer pour une solution ad hoc”. In [31], 87–105

    Google Scholar 

  30. Panaccio, C. (2005). “Le paradoxe du menteur et le langage mental: réflexions sur l'approche restrictionniste”. In [3], 57–71

    Google Scholar 

  31. [31] Pelletier, Jérôme and Joëlle Proust eds (2001).La normativité.Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen

    Google Scholar 

  32. Peter of Ailly. See [46]

    Google Scholar 

  33. Peter of Spain. See [15]

    Google Scholar 

  34. [34] Pironet, F. (2004).Johannes Buridanus. Summulae de practica sophismatum. Groningen: Ingenium

    Google Scholar 

  35. [35] Priest, G. (1987).In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent.Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff

    Google Scholar 

  36. [36] Read, S. ed. (1993).Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar.Dordrecht: Kluwer

    Google Scholar 

  37. [37] Read, S. (2002). “The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine”.Vivarium40, 189–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. [38] Roure, M.-L. (1970). “La problématique des propositions insolubles au xiiiesiècle et au début du xive, suivie de l'édition des traitésde W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine”.Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 37, 205–326

    Google Scholar 

  39. Scotus, J.D. See [55]

    Google Scholar 

  40. [40] Simmons, K. (1993).Universality and the Liar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  41. Simon of Faversham. See [16]

    Google Scholar 

  42. [42] Soames, S. (1999).Understanding Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  43. [43] Sorensen, R.A. (1998). “Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars”.Mind107, 137–155

    Article  Google Scholar 

  44. [44] Spade, P.V. (1974). “Ockham on Self-Reference”.Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic15, 298–300

    Article  Google Scholar 

  45. [45] Spade, P.V. (1975).The Mediaeval Liar: A Catalogue of theInsolubilia-Literature. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

    Google Scholar 

  46. [46] Spade, P.V. (1980).Peter of Ailly. Concepts and Insolubles(Engl. transl.). Dordrecht: Reidel

    Google Scholar 

  47. Spade, P.V. (1982). “Insolubilia”. In [21], 246–253

    Google Scholar 

  48. [48] Spade, P.V. (1987). “Five Early Theories in the MediaevalInsolu-bilia-Literature”.Vivarium25, 24–46

    Article  Google Scholar 

  49. [49] Spade, P.V. (1988).Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages. London: Variorum Reprints

    Google Scholar 

  50. [50] Synan, E.A. (1968).The Works of Richard of Campsall. Vol. I:Ques-tiones super Librum Priorum Analeticorum. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

    Google Scholar 

  51. [51] Tarski, A. (1944). “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics”.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research4, 341–375

    Article  Google Scholar 

  52. Tarski, A. (1956a). “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” (Engl. transl.). In [53], 152–278

    Google Scholar 

  53. [53] Tarski, A. (1956b).Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  54. Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1972). “Inference and Self-Reference”. In [12], 695–708

    Google Scholar 

  55. [55] Wadding, L. (1968).Iohannes Duns Scotus Opera omnia. (Reprint from the 1639 edition). Hildesheim: Georg Olms

    Google Scholar 

  56. William of Ockham. See [4, 13, 24]

    Google Scholar 

  57. William of Sherwood (Pseudo-). See [38]

    Google Scholar 

  58. [58] Yablo, S. (1993). “Paradox without Self-Reference”.Analysis53, 251–252

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Claude Panaccio University of Quebec at Montreal, Montreal, Quebec, H3C 3P8, Canada

    Claude Panaccio

Authors
  1. Claude Panaccio
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FI-00014, Finland

    Tero Tulenheimo

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Springer Science + Business Media B.V

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Panaccio, C. (2008). Restrictionism: A Medieval Approach Revisited. In: Rahman, S., Tulenheimo, T., Genot, E. (eds) Unity, Truth and the Liar. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8468-3_14

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation