Attempting to resolve the Liar paradox in a simple and straightforward way, Stephen Read suggests a modification of Tarski's famous truth-schema that he claims turns the Liar paradox into an innocent sentence, which is simply false. In my note I examine the way Read tries to solve the paradox and argue that some doubts can be raised regarding the successfulness of his attempt. I analyze his project from two independent points of view. First, I try to shed light on some weak points in Read's argument, then I present my own arguments to the effect that any revision of Tarski's truth-schema can, in principle, be only a part of the solution to the Liar paradox.
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Serény, G. (2008). The Liar Cannot Be Solved. In: Rahman, S., Tulenheimo, T., Genot, E. (eds) Unity, Truth and the Liar. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8468-3_10
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