Since Tarski published his study of the concept of truth in the 1930s, it has been orthodox practice to suppose that every instance of the T-schema is true. However, some instances of the schema are false. These include the paradoxical instances exemplified by the Liar sentence. It is shown that a better schema allows a uniform treatment of truth in which the semantic paradoxes turn out to be simply false.
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Read, S. (2008). The Truth Schema and the Liar. In: Rahman, S., Tulenheimo, T., Genot, E. (eds) Unity, Truth and the Liar. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8468-3_1
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