Abstract
One of the most well-known elements of Avicenna’s philosophy is the famous thought experiment known as the “Flying Man.” The Flying Man argument attempts to show that the soul possesses innate awareness of itself, and it has often been viewed as forerunner to the Cartesian cogito. But Avicenna’s reflections on the nature of self-awareness and self-consciousness are by no means confined to the various versions of the Flying Man. Two of Avicenna’s latest works, the Investigations and the Notes, contain numerous discussions of the soul’s awareness of itself. From an examination of these works I show that Avicenna recognizes two distinct levels of self-knowledge: (1) primitive self-awareness, which is illustrated by the Flying Man; and (2) reflexive self-awareness, which comes from our awareness of cognizing some object other than ourselves. While Avicenna assigns primitive self-awareness a central role in ensuring the unity of the soul’s operations, he encounters a number of difficulties in his efforts to explicate the relation of primitive self-awareness to the reflexive varieties of self-knowledge that he inherits from the Aristotelian tradition.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M.: 1975, “The First Person”, reprinted in Q. Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, pp. 140–159.
Bäck, A.: 1994, “The Islamic Background: Avicenna (b. 980; d. 1037) and Averroes (b. 1126; d. 1198)” in J. Gracia (ed.), Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150–1650, pp. 39–67, State University of New York Press, Albany.
Barnes, J. (ed.): 1984,The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, J. Barnes (ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Black, D. L.: 1993, “Estimation in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions”, Dialogue 32, 219–58.
Black, D. L.: 1999a, “Conjunction and the Identity of Knower and Known in Averroes”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73, 159–184.
Black, D. L.: 1999b, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna” Mediaeval Studies 61, 45–79.
D’Alverny, M-Th.: 1959, “Anniyya-Anitas” in Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, pp. 59–91.
Dhanani, A.: 1994, The Physical Theory of Kalām, Leiden, Brill.
Druart, T.-A.: 1988, “The Soul and Body Problem: Avicenna and Descartes” in T.-A. Druart (ed.), Arabic Philosophy and the West: Continuity and Interaction, Washington D.C., Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, pp. 27–48.
Druart, T.-A.: 2000, “The Human Soul’s Individuation and its Survival after the Body’s Death: Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soul”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10, 259–74.
Frank, R.: 1956, “The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term ﭟ#x0201D;, Cahiers de Byrsa, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, pp. 181–201.
Gerson, L.: 1997, “‘πτστρoφη πρòζ εαυτo;v: History and Meaning”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 15, 1–32.
Gilson, E.: 1929–30, “Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 4, 5–149.
Gutas, D.: 1988,Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, Brill Leiden.
Hasnawi, A.: 1997, “La conscience de soi chez Avicenne et Descartes” in J. Biard and R. Rashed (eds.), Descartes et le moyen âge, Vrin, Paris, pp. 283–91.
Hasse, D.: 2000, Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West, The Warburg Institute, London.
Marmura, M. E.: 1975, “Ghazali’s Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic” in G. Hourani (ed.), Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 100–120.
Marmura, M. E.: 1979, “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals in the Isagoge of his Shifā’” in A. T. Welch and P. Cachia (eds.), Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge, Edinburgh Univ. Press, Edinburgh, pp. 34–56.
Marmura, M. E.: 1984, “Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysicsof His Al-Shifā’” in R. M. Savory and D. Agius (eds.), Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, pp. 219–240.
Marmura, M. E.: 1986, “Avicenna’s ‘Flying Man’ in Context”, The Monist 69, 383–95.
Marmura, M. E.: 1992, “Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna” in M. Parviz (ed.), Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 77–87.
Pines, S.: 1954, “La conception de la conscience de soi chez Avicenne et chez Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 29, 21–56.
Rahman, F. (trans.): 1952, Avicenna’s Psychology, Oxford University Press, Oxford; reprinted Westport, CT 1981, Hyperion.
Reisman, D. C.: 2002, Al-Mubā .1athāt: The Making of the Avicennian Tradition, Brill, Leiden.
Van Den Bergh, S. (trans.): 1954, Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. 2, E. J. Gibb Memorial Trust, London.
Wisnovsky, R.: 2003, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Black, D. (2008). Avicenna on Self-Awareness and Knowing that One Knows. In: Rahman, S., Street, T., Tahiri, H. (eds) The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition. Logic, Epistemology, and The Unity of Science, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8405-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8405-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-8404-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-8405-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawHistory (R0)