Rationality of Moral Judgments

  • Aleksander Peczenik
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 8)


At first, I must return to the preliminary question, Why not to assume that legal conclusions can be true, even if they are fully justifiable only by a set of premises containing a norm or a value judgment? Such an assumption implies another one, namely that norms or value judgments themselves possess truth values. This is, of course, the central problem of value theory. Let me thus make some observations, belonging to this area.


Moral Judgment Moral Statement Moral Theory Weak Sense Practical Statement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aleksander Peczenik
    • 1
  1. 1.Lund UniversitySweden

Personalised recommendations