Abstract
At first, I must return to the preliminary question, Why not to assume that legal conclusions can be true, even if they are fully justifiable only by a set of premises containing a norm or a value judgment? Such an assumption implies another one, namely that norms or value judgments themselves possess truth values. This is, of course, the central problem of value theory. Let me thus make some observations, belonging to this area.
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© 1989 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Peczenik, A. (1989). Rationality of Moral Judgments. In: On Law and Reason. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8381-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8381-5_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-8381-5
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