Rationality of Moral Judgments

  • Aleksander Peczenik
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 8)

Abstract

At first, I must return to the preliminary question, Why not to assume that legal conclusions can be true, even if they are fully justifiable only by a set of premises containing a norm or a value judgment? Such an assumption implies another one, namely that norms or value judgments themselves possess truth values. This is, of course, the central problem of value theory. Let me thus make some observations, belonging to this area.

Keywords

Income Coherence Assure Equa Lity Defend 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aleksander Peczenik
    • 1
  1. 1.Lund UniversitySweden

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