Alternatives to Expected Utility: Foundations

  • Robert Sugden


In the last twenty-five years, an enormous amount of work has been done to develop new decision theories which can accommodate patterns of choice that contravene expected utility theory. This chapter surveys some of the main approaches that have been taken by these alternatives to expected utility theory.


Subjective Probability Utility Theory Stochastic Dominance Indifference Curve Expect Utility Theory 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Sugden
    • 1
  1. 1.University of East AngliaNorwichUK

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